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SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON WEST SUMATRA 
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Audrey Kahin
Japanese Impact on Sumatra
At the time o f  Tokyo’ s surrender in  August 1945 Indonesian n a tion ­
a l i s t s  on Sumatra were i l l -p r e p a r e d , p o l i t i c a l l y  and m i l i t a r i ly ,  to  
take over adm in istration  from the departing Japanese. During the o ccu ­
p ation  the is la n d  had been governed by the Japanese 25th Army sep ara te ly  
from Java and other parts o f  the Indonesian a r c h ip e la g o .1 In a d d it io n , 
Japanese adm in istration  in  Sumatra was fa r  more d ecen tra lized  than that 
on Java. Although in A p ril 1943 the Japanese m ilita ry  a d m in istra tion ’ s 
headquarters (gunseikanbu) which had au th ority  over Sumatra was moved 
from Singapore to  B u k itt in g g i, the ten shu2 o f  Sumatra (correspon din g 
to the residen cy  d iv is io n s  under the Dutch) continued to  be governed in 
p r a c t ic e ,  as la rg e ly  autonomous u n its  by th e ir  in d iv id u a l governors 
(ohokan ) . 3
The in c lin a t io n  o f  the Japanese occu pation  fo rce s  throughout South­
east Asia towards such a d e cen tra lized  form o f  adm in istration  was based 
on the idea o f  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  fo r  each reg ion . In Sumatra th is
1. For the firs t  year of the occupation Sumatra was governed in conjunction with 
Malaya from the 25th Army Headquarters in Singapore. However, because of the 
differences in the character o f the regions and the economic importance of Suma­
tra, in April 1943 the 25th Army moved to Sumatra, followed by the Department of 
the Chief Military Administrator. From this time on, there were separate depart­
ments for Malaya and Sumatra, but nevertheless for a considerable period ties be­
tween Sumatra and Malaya continued to be regarded as more important than those 
between Sumatra and Java. Waseda Daigaku, Tokyo, Okuma Memorial Social Sciences 
Research Center (team led by Nishijima), Japanese Military Administration in 
Indonesia (Washington: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Clearing House for Federal Scien­
t i f i c  and Technical Information, Joint Publications Research Service, 1963), pp. 
110, 155-56.
2. George S. Kanahele, ’’The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Indepen­
dence” (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), p. 62. These were divided into 
bunshu (sub-shu), gun and son. The ten shu were Atjeh, East Sumatra, Tapanuli, 
West Sumatra, Riau (excluding the islands), Djambi, Palembang, Bengkulen, Lam- 
pung and Bangka-Belitung. See Map 1 for the residency divisions.
3. In each o f the shu or ’’States,” a ’’State Governor, Director o f General Affairs, 
Director o f Industrial Affairs, and Director o f Police were established,” filled  
by Japanese civilian or military o ffic ia ls . See Nishijima, Japanese Military 
Administration, pp. 149-50, which also describes the powers o f these governors. 
According to Kanahele, ’’the Chokan of the West Coast and Palembang Shuu were 
given supervisory authority over neighboring Shuu involving matters such as 




general p o l ic y  was strengthened by the geography o f  the is la n d , the 
poor communications between the d if fe r e n t  areas, and the ch aracter o f  
the Japanese adm in istrators who were appointed t h e r e .4 However, the 
degree o f  d e ce n tra liz a t io n  led  to con s id erab le  hardship in parts o f  
Sumatra, p a r t ic u la r ly  the East Coast re s id en cy , which was cut o f f  from 
i t s  t r a d it io n a l sources o f  r ic e  supply and was hard put to provide 
b a s ic  n e c e s s it ie s  fo r  i t s  p opu lation  from i t s  own r e s o u r c e s .5
The 25th Army on Sumatra was much more re lu cta n t than i t s  cou n ter­
part on Java to a llow  Indonesians any rea l ro le  in  c iv i l i a n  or m ilita ry  
adm in istra tion . Only s low ly , p a r t ia l ly  and with re lu ctan ce  did  i t  f o l ­
low in i t ia t iv e s  launched by leaders o f  the Japanese 16th Army on Java 
towards granting a grea ter degree o f  independence to  the Indonesian 
n a t io n a l is e s .6 In the ea rly  months o f  the occu pation  the rep ress ive  
nature o f  the Japanese adm in istration  on Sumatra was probably a re su lt  
o f  i n i t i a l  plans which envisaged in clu d in g  Malaya and Sumatra d ir e c t ly  
w ith in  the Japanese em p ire ,7 because MMalaya and e s p e c ia lly  Sumatra" 
were seen as "the cen ter o f  in d u s tr ia l development in the Southern 
a re a ."  As "the nuclear Zone o f  the Em pire's plans fo r  the Southern 
area" these t e r r i t o r ie s  were to be t ig h t ly  c o n tr o lle d  and "a c lo s e  r e ­
la t io n sh ip  o f  mutual interdependence between [them] should be fo s te re d  
and measures taken so as to  provide fo r  th e ir  in t e g r a t io n ." 8 In the 
la te r  years o f  the occu pation  unw illin gness to grant rea l power to  the 
Sumatrans would have been in creased  by fea rs  that the A l l ie s  planned
4. For a discussion of the decentralized administration on Sumatra, see ib id . , p.
63; also pp. 281-82.
5. In Deli (East Sumatra) three-quarters o f the acreage o f land which in 1940 had 
been used for tobacco cultivation was switched to production of food crops. 
Throughout Sumatra the Military Administration Department controlled the indus­
tries relating to defense, such as rubber, tin and iron, while they encouraged 
the Indonesians to rehabilitate factories that would contribute to the goal of 
self-sufficiency and increase the production o f basic food supplies. Nishijima, 
Japanese military Administration, pp. 273, 292.
6. Anthony Reid, "The Birth o f the Republic in Sumatra,M Indonesia, No. 12 (October 
1971), p. 22.
7. Kanahele, !!Japanese Occupation,” p. 57.
8. All these quotations are from "Instructions on the Administration of Malaya and
Sumatra (April 1942)," which is translated as Document 44 in Benda, Irikura, and 
Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents 
(New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 169. By "indus­
tria l development" these instructions must have meant sources o f industrial 
materiel, as in 1942 there was l i t t le  industry on Sumatra. The record o f Japa­
nese negotiations with the Dutch during 1940-41 shows that o il was the most vital 
product needed by Japan after the United States had moved to limit exports there 
in July 1940. See H. J. van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and Japan (London: 
George Allen § Unwin, 1944), pp. 37, 51-63, 86. Two months before negotiations 
were broken o f f  in July 1941, the Japanese were requesting up to 3,800,000 tons 
p.a. of mineral o i l .  Van Mook believed that with regard to rubber and tin 
Japan*s most critica l needs had already been met by her control over Thailand 
and Indochina: "The two countries together produced 130,000 tons of rubber annu­
ally as against a Japanese consumption in past years o f 50,000 tons; her need 
for 10,000 tons of tin per annum was exceeded by at least 50 per cent in the pro­
duction o f her new sphere of influence." Ibid. , p. 77. See also Kanahele, 
"Japanese Occupation," pp. 38-39, 265.
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landings in  Sumatra as the spearhead o f  th e ir  cou n ter-a tta ck  against 
the Japan ese .9 Thus, c e r ta in ly  u n t il  1945 there was l i t t l e  mention o f  
eventual independence, and the Japanese a c t iv e ly  d iscouraged any n ation  
a l i s t  movements on the is la n d .
I t  is  against the background o f  these fa c to r s  that one should view 
such la t e r  Japanese statem ents on the backwardness o f  the Sumatrans' 
p o l i t i c a l  consciousness as that o f  General Shimura:
The demand for independence was not nearly so strong as in Java.
The opinion of the Japanese Army o ffic ia ls  in Sumatra was that the 
people of that country were not sufficiently developed, socially and 
culturally, to take on themselves the responsibilities o f self-gov­
ernment . 10
For a short p eriod  a fte r  they invaded Sumatra the Japanese had 
fo s te re d  the hopes o f  Indonesian n a t io n a l is t s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  the Islam ic 
lea d ers . P rior  to th e ir  lan d in gs, accord in g  to  Benda, they had support 
ed the foundation  o f  Islam ic anti-D utch  res is ta n ce  groups both in  A tjeh  
and in West Sumatra which had promoted the idea that the coming o f  the 
Japanese would lead  to In d on esia 's  independen ce.11 During the ea rly  
months o f  the occu pation  they had a lso  perm itted  Sukarno to  e s ta b lis h  a 
"Komite R akjat" in  Padang which spread to  other parts o f  West Sumatra12 
and Chatib Suleiman to form h is  "Pemuda Nippon R a ja ." 13 This freedom , 
however, apparently la s te d  on ly  u n t il  they con so lid a ted  th e ir  au th ority  
on the is la n d , a fte r  which both o f  these orga n iza tion s  were d isso lv e d
9. The number o f Japanese troops on Sumatra probably exceeded those on Java through 
much of the occupation. Kanahele notes that on Java their military forces were 
reduced from 45-50,000 in March 1942 to about 10,000 by November o f that year, 
though in the last year of the war they were again increased to 40-50,000 
("Japanese Occupation," pp. 65, 282). Before their invasion of Sumatra the 
Allies estimated that there were 71,500 Japanese on Sumatra, though it  is un­
clear how many of these were military men. See Rajendra Singh, Post-War Occupa­
tion Forces: Japan and South-East Asia (in the series O fficial History of the 
Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45) (New Delhi: Combined Inter- 
Services Historical Section India § Pakistan, 1958), p. 255. Wehl states that 
there were totals o f approximately 70,000 Japanese on Java and 75,000 on Sumatra 
at the time o f the surrender, but does not break these figures down between 
civilian and military. David Wehl, The Birth o f Indonesia (London: George Allen 
§ Unwin, 1948), p. 3.
10. Quoted in Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 23.
11. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), 
pp. 105-6. According to M. D. Mansoer, et a l ., Sedjarah Minangkabau (Djakarta: 
Bhratara, 1970), pp. 216-17, Islamic leaders were favored by the Japanese in 
contrast with adat and intellectual leaders throughout the occupation, but i f  
this were the case it  must have been at the personal level. In general, the 
Japanese appear to have maintained a balance between adat, Islamic and other 
groups. See nn. 14 and 15 below.
12. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 28-29, 259; Kementerian Penerangan, Repub- 
lik  Indonesia: Propinsi Sumatera Tengah (n.p., n .d ., c. 1954), p. 457. Sukarno 
was detained in Padang in the spring o f 1942 before returning to Java, after his 
detention by the Dutch in Bengkulen. (Propinsi Sumatera Tengah will be abbrevi­
ated to PST in the footnotes hereafter.)
13. Ibid., pp. 79, 457.
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and the pemuda leaders b r i e f ly  a rrested . The organ iza tion s that were 
allow ed to  continue were expected  to  eschew any p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s . 1 lf
In comparison with Java, advisory  groups o f  Indonesians w ith in  the 
lo c a l  shu were la te  in  being e s ta b lis h e d , w ith the excep tion  o f  West 
Sumatra where ChSkan Yano se t  up a co n su lta tiv e  co u n c il as ea r ly  as 
July 1942, w ith 15-20 members drawn from "a d a t, Islam ic and n a t io n a lis t  
groups." i s  Elsewhere in  Sumatra these reg ion a l advisory  co u n c ils  (Shu 
S an gi-k ai) were on ly  se t  up in  November 1943, and no Sumatra-wide cen ­
t r a l  advisory  co u n cil p a r a l le l  to  that on Java was e s ta b lish e d  u n t il  
1 9 45 .14 56 Attempts by Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad S ja fe i  in  July 1943 
to  e s ta b lis h  a reg ion a l Putera, corresponding to  the b a s ic  o rga n iza tion  
on Java, were quashed by the Japanese a u t h o r i t ie s ,17 so that u n t i l  1945 
Indonesian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the government was r e s t r ic t e d  to  the lo c a l  
advisory  c o u n c ils .
There was a more rap id  development o f  the Indonesian m ilita ry  
fo r ce s  on Sumatra than o f  the c iv i l i a n  o rg a n iza t io n s , but they shared 
the same c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  d e c e n t r a l iz a t io n .18 The Heiho had been 
formed very sh o r tly  a fte r  the a r r iv a l o f  the Japanese in  March 1942, 
and in  November 1943, a month a ft e r  establishm ent o f  the Peta on Java, 
i t s  Sumatran eq u iv a len t, the Gyugun (Lasjkar R akjat) was form ed .19 
Members o f  the Gyugun were tra in ed  and quartered  near th e ir  home d i s ­
t r i c t s ,  and i n i t i a l l y  the la rg e s t  un it was the p la toon . L ater, how­
ev er , companies were organ ized , some under Indonesian commanders, and 
th e ir  was rep orted ly  one b a tta lio n  in  South Sumatra under a Japanese 
o f f i c e r . 20 Although accord in g  to  Kanahele, the s iz e  o f  the Gyugun was 
sm aller than that o f  the P e ta ,21 i t  too  prov ided  tra in in g  fo r  many o f
14. They included the Muhammadijah, Perti, the Madjelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam 
Minangkabau (MTKAAM), and the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT). Ibid. , p. 458.
15. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 68. This council, a successor of the Minang­
kabau Raad of the Dutch period, apparently met regularly. It was formed and led 
by Sjafei, Sjech M. Djamil Djambek (representing the ulama) and Chatib Suleiman 
from the pemuda group. PST, p. 79. In the following March, a 56-member in sti­
tute to study adat problems relating to regional administration was set up under 
the chairmanship of Datuk Simaradjo (Balai Penjelidikan Masjarakat Minangkabau). 
Chokan Yano's sympathy toward ideas o f Indonesian independence led to his re­
moval from Sumatra in April 1944. See Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 148, 
306.
16. Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, p. 172.
17. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 86-87.
18. Apart from the small size and local nature of the units, there were at least 
three training schools for the Gyugun, at Padang, Pagar Alam and Siborongborong 
(West, South, and East Sumatra). Ibid. , p. 128. According to the PST, p. 79, 
it  was as a result o f the arguments o f Chatib Suleiman (who became its head in 
West Sumatra) that the Japanese agreed to form the Gyugun in Minangkabau.
19. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 128. 20. Ibid. , p. 129.
21. Kanahele estimates its peak strength in 1945 at 8,000 as compared with 33,000 
on Java. Ibid. , p. 129. However, Reid puts its  size at 30,000 (Anthony Reid,
The Indonesian National Revolution [Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman Australia,
1974], p. 14) and the Propinsi at 44,000 (PST, p. 541).
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the young o f f i c e r s  who would lead  the independence stru gg le  a fte r  the 
w a r.22 S erv ice  A ssoc ia tion s  (Koenkai ) were a lso  organized  to  ra ise  
popular support fo r  these fo r c e s ,  but these too e x is te d  on a purely  
reg ion a l b a s is . In West Sumatra the lo c a l  Koenkai was headed by Chatib 
Suleiman and S j a f e i . 23
Thus, when the Japanese 25th Army f in a l ly  agreed in ea r ly  1945 to 
promote Sumatran n a t io n a lis t  o rg a n iza t io n s24 there was an absence o f  
e a r l ie r  groups on which to  b u ild , and few Sumatrans had been c lo s e ly  
in volved  in  the bureaucracy or a d m in is tra tio n .25 On an u n o f f i c ia l  
ba sis  the Japanese had recogn ized  the standing o f  severa l Sumatran 
leaders as th e ir  a d v iso rs : Chatib Suleiman and S ja fe i  in  West Sumatra,
A. K. Gani in  Palembang, Hamka and Adinegoro in East Sumatra, and Daud 
Beureuh,*Nja A r i f ,  and Mohammad A li  in  A t je h .26 These men, however,
22. Kanahele lists  among its platoon commanders, Achmad Tahir, Sitompul, Ismael 
Lengah, Bambang Oetojo, Dachlan Ibrahim, Hoesein, Amir Noor, and Gingtings. 
Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 128-29.
23. Mohammad Sjafei (1897-1969) was born in West Kalimantan and was the adopted son 
of Marah Soetan. He attended the Sekolah Radja in Bukittinggi from 1908 to 1914. 
He was a member o f Boedi Utomo and later the Indische P artij. During the 1930s 
he was associated with the PNI-Baru. In 1926 he founded the Indische Nationale 
School (INS) in Kaju Tanam. It changed its  name to Indonesia-Nippon at the time 
o f the Japanese occupation. See Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum 
Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia 
Project, 1971), p. 127; Reid, "Birth of the Republic," p. 27; Kementerian Pene- 
rangan, Kami Perkenalkan (Djakarta: n .p ., n .d .), p. 120.
Chatib Suleiman (1906-49) was bom in Sumpur (on Lake Singkarak) o f poor 
parents. He was educated only at MULO. After leaving school he moved to Padang 
Pandjang where he became a follower o f Hatta and was active in the PNI-Baru.
After the party was dissolved he turned to economic activity and was one o f the 
founders o f Inkorba (an Indonesian import firm established in Bukittinggi on 
February 28, 1938) and the National Bank. He was arrested by the Dutch for sus­
pected Japanese sympathies and exiled to Atjeh, only returning with the Japa­
nese. Hamka writes o f him: " I f  one wishes to define his sp irit, there were
gathered love for his country, socialist ideas, Islamic religion and a 'Minang1 
soul." He likens him to Hatta in his social relationships and considers him as 
being the mind behind most o f S ja fei's  programs. See Haji Abdul Malik Karim 
Amrullah (Hamka), Kenang-kenangan Hidup (2nd ed.; Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 
1966), pp. 422-25; Sumatera Tengah, March 10, 1953; January 25, 1954.
24. In January 1945 it  was announced that a Sumatra Central Advisory Council would 
be set up, the number o f Sumatrans in the administration and the advisory coun­
cils  would be increased, and that H5k5kai (Patriotic Service Organizations) 
would be established. The H5kokai were set up as separate, apparently autono­
mous, units in the different shu. (Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. ISO- 
82.) The leaders o f the H5k5kai o f West Sumatra were Sjafei, Chatib Suleiman,
R. Datoek Perpatih, and Datuk Madjo Oerang. Ibid. , p. 314.
25. According to Kanahele in the regional administration the highest positions held 
by Indonesians on Sumatra were those of d istrict head and mayor. There was an 
Indonesian mayor in Padang (Dr. A. Hakim) and a deputy mayor o f Palembang (Radnen 
Hanan). Ibid. , pp. I l l ,  181, 314.
26. These were all nominated to the Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council) of 
Sumatra, which has its firs t  and only meeting in Bukittinggi in June-July, 1945. 
Also participating from West Sumatra were Dt. Perpatih Baringek (from the adat 
group) and A. R. St. Mansur (representing the ulama). An account o f this meet­
ing appears in Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 261-66.
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played  no a ct iv e  r o le  in  adm in istra tion , and th e ir  advisory  p o s it io n s  
were r e s t r ic t e d  to th e ir  own reg ion .
The lack  o f  a Sumatra-wide lead ersh ip  or indigenous adm in istra tion  
embracing the whole is la n d  had a con s id erab le  bearing on the way in  
which the independence s tru gg le  developed in Sumatra. The n a t io n a lis t  
movements on the is la n d  grew in to  la rg e ly  autonomous lo c a l  orga n iza ­
tion s  and never achieved the degree o f  coord in a tion  necessary to  b u ild  
up a u n ifie d  Sumatran s t r u c tu r e .27
West Sumatra a fte r  the Independence Proclam ation
The surrender o f  the Japanese on August 14 occu rred  at a time when 
the P an itia  Persiapan Kemerdekaan IndonesiS (PPKI) [Committee fo r  the 
P reparation  o f  Indonesian Independence] was gathering in D ja k a rta ,28 
the f i r s t  occa s ion  on which there had been d ir e c t  Sumatran communica­
t io n  w ith the n a t io n a lis t  fo r ce s  on Java s in ce  the beginning o f  the 
occu p a tion . The Japanese had appointed three de legates  from Sumatra to  
th is  c o n fe r e n c e :29 Abdul Abbas, Dr. Mohammad Amir, and Teuku Mohammad 
Hasan.30 The ch o ice  appears a strange one, fo r  although rep resen tin g  
three o f  the main e th n ic  groups on the is la n d , the men were not as 
w idely  known as, fo r  example, Gani, S ja fe i  and A dinegoro. I t  has been 
argued that they were p o s s ib ly  not so committed to the idea o f  a Suma­
tran sta te  as were some o f  the oth er lead ers favored  by the 25th Army,31 
but i t  appears probable that the op p osite  was in fa c t  the ca se ; and 
that these men were stron ger supporters o f  autonomy from Java than were 
S ja fe i ,  A dinegoro, Gani, who a l l  had c lo s e  t ie s  with the n a t io n a lis t  
leaders on J a v a .32 In the f i r s t  se ss ion  o f  the PPKI, Dr. Amir in  p ar­
27. With regard to relations with Java, however, the ban imposed by the 25th Army
on any v isits to Sumatra by nationalist leaders from there does not seem to have 
affected Sumatran recognition o f Sukarno-Hatta as the supreme leaders o f the 
nationalist movement in Indonesia. See B. R. O’ G. Anderson, Some Aspects of 
Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modem Indonesia Project, 1961), p. 12; Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 223; 
Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 263; Reid, "Birth of the Republic," pp. 39-40.
28. A Sumatran "Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence" had been 
announced on July 25, under the chairmanship o f S jafei, and with Adinegoro as 
head of the secretariat. It consisted of 24 members (including 15 from the 
Central Advisory Council). Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 231-32.
29. They were taken firs t  to Singapore, where they saw Hatta and Sukarno returning 
from Saigon. According to Hatta, the two groups had separate meetings with the 
Japanese there. See Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1970), pp. 
23-25.
30. Abbas was a Mandailing Batak, Dr. Amir a Minangkabau and Hasan an Atjehnese.
For biographical notes see Reid, "Birth of the Republic," pp. 27, 30.
31. Reid states: "It seems possible that the Japanese planners in Singapore or Dja­
karta distrusted the leadership developed by the intransigent 25th Army as too 
distinctly Sumatran, or too much the creatures o f the Gunseikan." Ibid ., p.
30.
32. Adran Kapau Gani, for example, in January 1946, was asserting that South Suma­
tra ’ s lack o f leaders demanded a flood o f Javanese pemuda and military men to
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t ic u la r  was arguing fo r  con s id erab le  Sumatran autonom y.33 Over the 
o b je c t io n s  o f  H atta, the committee decided  that Sumatra as a whole 
would co n s titu te  a s in g le  p ro v in ce , w ith i t s  ca p ita l in  Medan and with 
Hasan as i t s  g o v e rn o r .3**
While these d e c is io n s  were being reached in  D jakarta, however, in  
West Sumatra the pemuda were already moving to take over co n tro l from 
the occu pation  fo r c e s .  Although news o f  the Japanese surrender d id  not 
reach Medan u n t il  August 2 2 ,35 rep orts  o f  the Independence Proclam ation 
had reached Padang and B u k ittin gg i at le a s t  by August 1 8 .36 I t  is  r e ­
ported  that on that day Ismael Lengah organized  a meeting in  Padang o f  
former members o f  the Heiho and Gyugun37 and by August 25 th is  group 
had formed a B alai Penerangan Pemuda Indonesia (BPPI) under h is  le a d e r ­
s h i p .38 At about the same time the pemuda in B u k ittin gg i were a lso  
h old in g  m eetings, and by August 25 had formed th e ir  own o rg a n iza tio n ,
the island. G. W. Overdijking, Het Indonesische Probleem: De Feiten (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1946), p. 84. Adinegoro was the only "resident Sumatran in a 
potential Indonesian Cabinet presented to the Japanese in March 1942 by the 
leading nationalist parties.11 Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," pp. 27-28; Nishi- 
jima, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 342-43. S ja fe i’ s stance in favor of 
Sumatran autonomy (see Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization as a Political Prob­
lem [Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1958], p. 41) appears to have de­
veloped later, and was partly a result of the centralization policies o f Dja­
karta after the transfer o f sovereignty. He was to have been a representative 
to the PPKI, but his departure was forbidden by the Japanese. (PST, p. 83.)
33. Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang2 Dasar 1945 (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapan- 
tja , 1959), I, p. 410. Amir later claimed that the selection o f delegates was 
named by Java behind the backs o f the Sumatrans (see Kanahele, "Japanese Occupa­
tion ," n. 126, p. 321b), but this seems unlikely.
34. Yamin, Naskah, pp. 451-52. Hatta was arguing for the division o f Sumatra into 
three provinces, as were several other members on the committee. Hasan was the 
strongest proponent o f a single Sumatran province, and he was also opposed to 
the idea o f subprovinces. His reasoning is not very clear. See also Hatta, 
Sekitar Proklamasi, pp. 71-72.
35. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 272. Hamka was then in Medan, but immediately set 
o f f  for Bukittinggi to find out what the Sumatran attitude towards the changed 
situation might be. He arrived there on August 27, meeting with Chatib Sulei­
man, Mr. Nasroen, and Aziz Chan. Sjafei was then at his home village o f Kaju- 
tanam, proceeding to Padang on the night of August 28. (Ibid. , pp. 278-79.)
36. PST, p. 542; Departemen P.D. dan K., Biro Pemuda, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda 
Indonesia (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1965), p. 155. News of the Japanese surren­
der did not apparently reach West Sumatra either until August 21.
37. Dates are unclear as to when the Japanese disarmed the Heiho and Gyugun. 
According to PST, p. 83, this took place in Bukittinggi on August 15, while 
Reid states that the Gyugun was disarmed between August 19 and 21. (Reid,
"Birth o f the Republic," p. 37.)
38. Headed by Ismael Lengah and Suleiman, the Propinsi lists  other leaders of the 
BPPI as: Nasrun A.S., Jahja D jalil, Dahlan J. St. Mangkuto, Iljas Jacub, 
Burhanuddin, Dr. Nazaruddin, Rusdi, Kasim Dt. Malilit Alam, S jarif Usman, BGD. 
Aziz Chan, Chatib Suleiman. (PST, p. 87.) This cannot be exact for at least 
Iljas Jacub and Burhanuddin had not yet returned from their exile in Digul.
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the Pemuda Indonesia ( P I ) , whose name a few weeks la t e r  was changed to 
Pemuda Republik Indonesia (P R I ) .39 40123
Toward the end o f  the month two o f  the Sumatran delegates to the 
PPKI, Hasan and Dr. Amir, passed through B u k ittin gg i on th e ir  way from 
Palembang to  Medan, and conveyed the in s tru c t io n s  o f  the committee r e ­
garding form ation  o f  a KNI (Komit6 N asional In d o n e s ia ), a defense fo r ce  
(Badan Keamanan R akjat, BKR) and the s ta te  PNI p a rty . At a meeting in  
Padang on August*29, S ja fe i  read the Independence Proclam ation and ex ­
pressed  the lo y a lty  o f  the Indonesian people on Sumatra to  the Sukarno- 
Hatta le a d e r s h ip .1*0 The Hokokai in West Sumatra formed i t s e l f  in to  a 
KNI, w ith S ja fe i  at i t s  head, Dt. Perpatih  Baringek and M. Djamil as 
h is  d ep u ties , and S t. Mohd. R as jid  as t r e a s u r e r .1*1
Although Sumatra was now o f f i c i a l l y  u n if ie d  as one prov in ce w ith in  
the R epublic o f  In don esia , th is  fa c t  had l i t t l e  in flu en ce  on the course 
o f  events on the is la n d . From the beginning the new Governor Hasan was 
handicapped in attem pting to  a ssert  lead ersh ip  because he was r e la t iv e ­
ly  unknown ou ts id e  o f  A tjeh  and Medan.1*2 N either Palembang nor West 
Sumatra was l ik e ly  to welcome a lead  from Medan, even i f  i t  cou ld  be 
a sserted , as both reg ion s f e l t  they had b e t te r  q u a li f ic a t io n s  to assume 
such a r o le .  The fa c t  that B u k ittin gg i had during the Japanese occupa­
t io n  been the o f f i c i a l  cen ter o f  Sumatra c le a r ly  in flu en ced  the a t t i ­
tude o f  the people in  West Sumatra. Throughout the re v o lu tio n  events 
in that reg ion  tended to  be viewed in the con text o f  those occu rrin g  on 
Java rather than o f  those in  oth er parts o f  Sumatra. The k insh ip  o f  
the Minangkabau with th e ir  rep resen ta tiv e  in  the Dwitunggal, H atta, was 
c lo s e r  than with the Sumatran governor; and, o f  cou rse , severa l other 
Minangkabau were prominent in  the rep u b lican  cen tra l lead ersh ip  on 
Java.
The tendency to autonomous development in  West Sumatra was fu rth er 
in creased  by the pattern  o f  A ll ie d  landings and Dutch plans fo r  gain ing 
co n tro l over the d if fe r e n t  parts o f  the is la n d . As ea rly  as the end o f  
August small u n its o f  Dutch o f f i c e r s  were beginning to  a rr iv e  in  Medan,1*3
39. On August 21 a meeting was held at the o ffice  o f the Madjelis Islam Tinggi at
the initiative o f the following pemuda: Chaidir Gazali, Nasrul, Noesjirwan Ami-
nuddin Junus, Zainul, R. Hadjimar Bermawi, Marakarma, Sjofjan Kamal, Sjahbuddin; 
at a further meeting four days later the PI was formed. Also present at that 
meeting were Iskandar Tedjasukmana and S jarif Usman. ( Ibid. , p. 88.) In a 
later part o f the Propinsi, however, it  is stated that the PRI was formed in 
Bukittinggi on August 29. In this account Nuzirwan (a pemuda newly arrived from 
Java) was present and he was named head o f the PRI for Bukittinggi. (Ib id ., p. 
544.)
40. Ibid. , pp. 84-86.
41. These men were successively to hold the post of resident of West Sumatra. For 
the fu ll membership o f the fir s t  KNI Sumatera Barat, see ib id . , pp. 380-81.
42. Governor Hasan attempted to strengthen feelings o f unity by visiting all the re­
gions o f the island. However, his firs t  tour around Sumatra in the early spring 
o f 1946 was probably occasioned largely by the events in East Sumatra during 
those months. See ib id . , p. 100; Semangat Merdeka, January 25, 1945; March 20, 
29, 1946; Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica, I (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), 
p. 224.
43. Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 32; Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 180. 
This was a party from RAPWI ALFSEA, who collected some o f the more important
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and from ea rly  October i t  was the springboard from which they hoped to 
re e s ta b lis h  th e ir  a u th ority  over Sumatra. From October 9, B r it is h  
fo r c e s ,  c h ie f ly  the 26th Indian D iv is io n ,**** began landing in  Medan, 
Padang and Palembang, but they con cen trated  on the more important s t r a ­
t e g ic  and economic areas round Medan and Palembang, a fte r  the end o f  
1945 never c o n tr o l l in g  any t e r r it o r y  in West Sumatra beyond the boun­
d aries o f  Padang.1+5 Thus, from the beginning the c a p ita l o f  the repub­
lic a n  government on Sumatra, Medan, was a lso  the cen ter o f  Dutch power, 
w hile u n t il  the end o f  1948 the repu blican  fo rce s  in  West Sumatra were 
able to  organize and run th e ir  own ad m in istra tion , only p e r ip h e ra lly  
a f fe c te d  by the Dutch fo r ce s  around the p ort c i t y  o f  Padang.1*6
In both m ilita ry  and c iv i l i a n  m atters, then, the stru gg le  against 
the Dutch in  West Sumatra was e s s e n t ia l ly  a lo c a l  one, l i t t l e  c o o r d i ­
nated w ith a ction s  in  other parts o f  the is lan d  and only f i t f u l l y  
meshed in w ith the o v e r a ll  plans being form ulated by the cen tra l gov­
ernment on Java. At the very o u ts e t , although the PPKI in  D jakarta had 
sent out orders fo r  a KNI, a PN I,4 567 and a p aram ilita ry  group to  be 
formed in  a l l  regions o f  Indon esia , no s p e c i f i c  in s tru ct io n s  were g iven , 
and i t  was l e f t  to  the in i t ia t iv e  o f  the lo c a l  leaders as to  how such 
groups were to  be se t  up.
As noted above, the KNI in  West Sumatra was e s ta b lish e d  on August 
31, but as w ith the organ iza tion s  during the Japanese p eriod  i t  would 
be inaccurate  to  assume that because the name and outward form o f  the 
org a n iza tion  p a r a lle le d  that on Java, i t s  content and ch aracter were 
a lso  s im ila r . While the lo c a l  KNI on Java were u su a lly  l i t t l e  more 
than figu reh ead s, w ith th e ir  working committees being the a ct iv e  b o d ie s ,
Dutch internees to discuss the evacuation o f Dutch prisoners of war via three of 
the principal towns on Sumatra: Medan, Padang and Palembang. See also Raymond
Westerling, Challenge to Terror (London: W. Kimber, 1952), pp. 37-38.
44. Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 240. He states that o f the division's 
three brigades earmarked for service in Sumatra (the 4th, 36th, and 71st), the 
36th was diverted to Java.
45. Padang became the headquarters o f the 26th Indian Division and its 71st Infantry 
Brigade. The Allies in itia lly  planned to occupy Bukittinggi, and the 8/8 Punjab 
Regiment reportedly arrived there from Medan on October 10. However, after the 
death of Brig. Maj. Anderson in Padang on December 3 (see n. 56 below) this 
regiment was moved from Bukittinggi to strengthen the forces on the coast. It 
appears that control even over Padang was always tenuous, for according to 
Singh, the arrival o f extra forces from Java on August 5, 1946, "enabled the 
whole of Padang town to be brought under effective control." Ibid., pp. 239, 
243-44.
46. This, of course, did not apply to economic matters which I have not the data to 
explore in this article . It is , however, clear that the Dutch control o f Padang 
did mean that the West Sumatrans were cut o f f  from their principal trading port 
except for a short period during the spring of 1947. The d ifficu lties caused by 
this were aggravated by the economic blockade carried out by the Dutch from late 
1947. Although this was by no means totally successful throughout the revolu­
tionary years the West Sumatrans apparently experienced considerable economic 
hardship as a result o f i t .
47. The plans for the PNI were almost immediately cancelled (B. R. O'G. Anderson, 
Java in a Time o f Revolution [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972], p. 95), 
and the state party appears never to have been formed in West Sumatra.
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in  West Sumatra the fu n ction in g  org a n iza tion  was the KNI i t s e l f ,  and i t  
was the movements both w ith in  th is  body and in  i t s  in te ra c t io n  with 
other groups in the reg ion  that shaped many o f  the p o l i t i c a l  d eve lop ­
ments in West Sumatra during the f i r s t  three years o f  the re v o lu t io n .
I t  took longer to  organize the m ilita ry  Badan Keamanan Rakjat 
(BKR)48 than the c iv i l i a n  KNI. The KNI took the f i r s t  steps on Septem­
ber 2 towards s e tt in g  up a BKR org a n iza tion  at the d i s t r i c t  le v e l  under 
co n tro l o f  Ismael Lengah, but throughout that month the two pemuda 
groups in West Sumatra, the BPPI in  Padang and the PRI in  B u k itt in g g i, 
reta in ed  th e ir  independence,49 w ith the PRI in  p a r t ic u la r  a lso  e s ta b ­
lis h in g  branches in  the towns and v i l la g e s  o f  the reg ion . Only when 
the A l l ie s  began to  land in Padang did  the two groups decide that th e ir  
members with m ilita ry  tra in in g  should jo in  the o f f i c i a l  TKR (Tentara 
Keamanan Rakjat) w hile the remainder would act as lo c a l  defense fo r ce s  
ou tsid e  o f  the o f f i c i a l  m ilita ry  s tru c tu re . The BPPI in Padang d is ­
banded i t s e l f  on October 10, w ith the m a jority  o f  i t s  members jo in in g  
the TKR, and on October 13 the PRI in  B u k ittin gg i a lso  moved to  amalga­
mate w ith the TKR.50 N on-m ilitary  members o f  both groups jo in e d  t o ­
gether in  the PRI o r g a n iz a t io n .51
The West Sumatrans i n i t i a l l y  cooperated  w ith the A ll ie d  f o r c e s .52 
However, as i t  gradually  became c le a r  that under th e ir  p ro te c t io n  the 
NICA (Netherlands Indies C iv i l  A dm in istration ) was being re -in trod u ced  
in c id en ts  soon began to  m u lt ip ly .53 These came to a head a fte r  Novem­
48. The name was changed on October 5 to TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat).
49. They also could not agree to unite with each other, though a meeting was held 
on September 15, primarily at the initiative o f Dt. Radjo Mangkuto, to attempt 
to achieve this. At this meeting Dahlan Djambek proposed recalling all former 
members of the Gyugun, Heiho and Kaigun to form a reserve military force. PST, 
pp. 544-45.
50. Ibid. , pp. 547-48. Local battalions were set up as follows: Padang (Jazid 
Abidin); Air Hadji Sungei Penuh (Thalib); Sp. Gaung Air Hadji (Alwi St. Mara- 
d jo ); Pariaman (Mahjudin Tonek); Padang Pandjang (Anas); Solok (S jarif Usman); 
Batu Sangkar (Dahlan Ibrahim); Bukittinggi (Dahlan Djambek); Pajakumbuh (Maki- 
nuddin); Bakan Baru (Hasan Basri); and Djambi (Abun Djani). See also A. H. 
Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (2nd ed.; Bandung: Ganaco, 1963), I, p. 113.
51. Until the end of 1945 this remained the principal pemuda organization, but as 
early as October 1, the Muhammadijah was organizing young members into the 
Hizbullah. (PST, p. 553.)
52. In general, the repatriation o f the Japanese went smoothly, though there were 
some frictions over the release of Dutch prisoners o f war. Raliby reports a 
battle between pemuda groups and former Dutch soldiers as early as October 15. 
Documenta, p. 57. See also Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, pp. 180-81,
256-57.
53. PST, pp. 96-98. On November 8 the BBC was reporting clashes at Padang between 
Indonesian nationalists and Indian forces. Raliby, Documenta, p. 85. See also 
Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda, p. 172, which reports that 
many of these clashes were then with remnants of the Japanese forces, during 
which a considerable number o f arms were seized. Nasution (TNI, I, p. 155) 
speculates that in East Sumatra there were sufficient arms for one or two infan­
try regiments, and in both Central and South Sumatra sufficient for several 
battalions, most o f which had presumably been seized from the Japanese.
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ber 25 when the B r it ish  command ceded the T echnical School o f  Simpang 
Haru in  Padang to  the NICA d esp ite  an e a r l ie r  agreement that the Dutch 
would not be allow ed to  occupy any part o f  the c i t y  w ithout the Indo­
n esian s ' p e rm iss io n .5t* Pemuda fo r c e s  almost immediately launched 
attacks against the sch oo l com plex, and in  e a r ly  December an E nglish 
brigade major and a "lady  worker" were a s s a s s in a te d .54 5 A fte r  th is  
occu rrence a s t r i c t  c iv i l i a n  curfew was imposed, and by the end o f  the 
year Padang was in a s ta te  o f  con s id erab le  te n s io n , w ith Indian troops 
from B u k ittin gg i being brought in  to  strengthen A ll ie d  co n tro l over the 
tow n .56
Upheaval and R eorgan ization
A d m in istra tive ly  the p rov in ce  o f  Sumatra was d iv id ed  in to  re s id e n ­
c i e s ,  each with i t s  lo c a l  KNI. The f i r s t  re s id en t o f  West Sumatra, 
S ja f e i ,  was appointed on October 1, and i n i t i a l l y  he a lso  headed the 
residen cy  KNI. At i t s  th ird  p lenary s e s s io n , held  in  m id-O ctober, how­
ev er , the KNI decided to separate the two p o s it io n s , with Dr. Djamil 
assuming the KNI le a d e r s h ip .57 O f f i c ia l l y  because o f  i l l -h e a l t h  S ja fe i  
was rep laced  as res id en t by Dt. P erpatih  Baringek in  the middle o f  
November.58 Under the new res id en t there were major personnel changes 
at the demang ( d i s t r i c t )  le v e l  and a b o v e .59 This r e s h u ffle  appears to  
have caused con s id erab le  d is s a t is fa c t io n ,  with severa l o f  the new o f f i ­
c i a l s ,  notab ly  in  Painan, S olok , Pajakumbuh and K e r in t ji  being r e je c te d  
by the lo c a l  KNI and by communist g ro u p s .60
54. PST, p. 99.
55. See Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 244; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 234-35; 
PST, p. 100, which suggests that i t  was the NICA who were responsible. The v ic­
tims were Brig. Maj. Anderson and Miss Allingham of the Red Cross.
56. Mountbatten states that "by December, the situation was so satisfactory that it  
was possible to divert to Java a brigade of 26 Indian Division intended for 
Sumatra." It seems likely that this diversion occurred before the death of 
Major Anderson. Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender 
Tasks: Section E o f the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme 
Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1969), p. 
299.
57. PST, pp. 382-83. At this same meeting the membership of the KNI was increased 
to 97, and attempts were made to include representatives o f all groups, organi­
zations and districts o f the region. See also ib id . , pp. 90-92.
58. Ibid. , p. 112.
59. The PST states that these changes were instituted "with the aim o f imbuing the 
administrative organization with revolutionary sp irit" (PST, p. 108). In view 
of the character and record o f Perpatih Baringek and the groups which protested 
the appointments this appears unlikely. But I have been unable to establish 
the reasons for and character o f the reorganization. For the officeholders as 
o f October 1, see ib id . , pp. 89-91; and for the new administrative o fficers , 
ib id . , pp. 108-10.
60. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in the Indies Col­
lection o f the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (hereafter IC-RVO), 
Amsterdam, p. 25.
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Up to A p ril 1946 there appears to have been p r a c t ic a l ly  no attempt 
on the c iv i l ia n  le v e l  by the cen tra l repu blican  lead ersh ip  to a ssert 
co n tro l over developments on Sumatra. No rep resen ta tives  o f  the cen­
t r a l  government v is i t e d  the is la n d  u n t il  that month, and most o f  the 
in i t ia t iv e s  e ith e r  to fo llo w  Javafs example or to organize independent 
organ iza tion s appear to have o r ig in a te d  from the Sumatran s i d e .6i
In the m ilita ry  f i e l d ,  however, attempts to  coord in ate  the Suma­
tran armed fo r ce s  and t ie  them in to  a TKR o rg a n iza tio n 61 2 coverin g  both 
Java and Sumatra began b e fo re  the end o f  1945, and were to continue 
throughout the re v o lu t io n . In ea rly  November, Dr. Gani was appointed 
the f i r s t  coo rd in a tor  o f  the TKR on Sumatra, which was to co n s is t  o f  a 
t o ta l  o f  s ix  d iv is io n s . A fte r  s e tt in g  up a general headquarters 
( markets bes&r umurn) fo r  the Sumatra command, Gani tra n sferred  au th ority  
to Suhardjo H ardjow ardojo, appointing him a major g e n e r a l.63 In th is  
i n i t i a l  orga n iza tion  D iv is ion s  I and II were resp on sib le  fo r  South 
Sumatra (with th e ir  headquarters at Lahat and Palembang), D iv is ion  I I I  
fo r  Central Sumatra (B u k it t in g g i) , D iv is ion  IV fo r  East Sumatra (Medan), 
D iv is ion  V fo r  A tjeh  (B ireu en ), and D iv is ion  VI fo r  Tapanuli and Nias 
(S ib o lg a ) . 64
The Banteng d iv is io n  (D iv is io n  I I I )  T s area o f  co n tro l was West 
Sumatra, Riau and the is la n d s , w hile Djambi was attached to  the Gadjah 
d iv is io n  o f  South Sumatra.65 The Banteng d iv is io n ’ s p r in c ip a l command­
ers were former members o f  the Gyugun f o r c e s ,  Dahlan Djambek and 
Ismael Lengah, a ss is te d  by S ja r i f  Usman.66 I t  co n s is te d  o f  fou r r e g i ­
61. There were two principal groups which visited Java before the end of 1945. The 
firs t  consisted o f pemuda who attended the Pemuda Congress in November. Clearly, 
however, many of the 166 Sumatrans who were reported to have attended the con­
ference were residents o f Java. (Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan 
Pemuda, p. 165.) The Atjehnese delegation consisted o f four Atjehnese students 
who were then studying on Java. Semangat Merdeka, November 17, 1945. The second 
group was a delegation from the provincial government of Sumatra consisting o f 
Dr. Amir, Mr. Luat Siregar, Dr. Djamil, and Adinegoro, who traveled around Java 
and had a meeting with Sukarno and Hatta on December 29. Raliby, Documenta, pp. 
170-71; PST, p. 102.
62. On January 25, 1946, the TKR became the Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI), and on 
May 5, 1947, its  name was again changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).
Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Peranan TNI Angkatan Darat dalam Perang 
Kemerdekaan (Revolusi Pisik 1945-1950) (Bandung: Pussemad, 1965), p. 210.
63. Nasution, TNI, I, pp. 159-61; Pusat Sedjarah Militer, Peranan TNI, pp. 207-8;
PST, pp. 550-51. Gani was appointed on November 5, 1945 (ib id . , p. 567). Suhar­
djo was born in Surakarta in 1901, and received military training in the Mangku- 
negaran Legion. Just before the war he moved to Lampung, and during the Japanese 
occupation was chief o f police for Tandjung Karang. T. B. Simatupang, Report 
from Banaran (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp. 66-67.
64. Nasution, TOI, I, pp. 159-60. 65. PST, p. 550.
66. Dahlan Djambek, son of the famous West Sumatran Muslim scholar, was bom in 1917 
and studied at a Christian high school in Djakarta for three years. He became 
an army o fficer in West Sumatra during the Japanese occupation. S jarif Usman
was bom in 1919 at Muara Panas, Solok. He was educated in an Islamic college 
in Padang, and finally studied economics at the National Academy. He taught 
firs t  in Djakarta, then in Padang. He gained the rank o f Lt. I. under the
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ments67 under the o v e ra ll lead ersh ip  o f  the d iv is io n  commander, Dahlan 
Dj ambek.
In a d d it io n , however, p aram ilita ry  or p e o p le ’ s s e cu r ity  fo r ce s  
were developing ou tsid e  o f  the TKR s tru c tu re . The e a r l ie s t  o f  these 
groups was made up o f  the members o f  the PRI o f  B u k ittin gg i and Padang 
who continued th e ir  o rga n iza tion  at a lo c a l  defense l e v e l . 68 The im­
portance o f  the PRI d ec lin ed  a fte r  the establishm ent o f  other ir re g u la r  
un its d ir e c t ly  t ie d  to  the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  the Islam ic 
o rg a n iza tion s , which began re e s ta b lish in g  themselves from ea rly  Novem­
ber 1945 .69 The two la rg e s t  Islam ic m ilita ry  orga n iza tion s  were the 
H izbu llah , which was formed at the inaugural meeting o f  the M adjelis 
Islam Tinggi (MIT) as a p o l i t i c a l  party in December 1945. The MIT in 
F ebru ary ,of the fo llo w in g  year was fused with the M asjum i.70 * Less
Japanese in Central Sumatra. I can fine no information on Ismael Lengah before 
he entered Gyugun. Simatupang, Report, p. 100; Parlaungan, Tokoh2 Parlemen 
(Djakarta: C. V. Gita, 1956), pp. 187-88.
67. Regiments I, II and III under Lt. Col. S jarif Usman, Lt. Col. Dahlan Djambek, 
and Lt. Col. Ismael Lengah were responsible for West Sumatra. Each was divided 
into three battalions. Regiment IV under Lt. Col. Hasan Basri was responsible 
for Riau and was divided into five battalions. (PST, p. 551.) At a meeting in 
mid-January Dahlan Djambek was appointed panglima of the Banteng division (with 
Lt. Col. Jazid Abidin as his chief o f s ta ff) , and his position as commander of 
Regiment II was taken by Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 210;
0. G. Roeder, Who’ s Who in Indonesia (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 149, 
for biographical details on Ibrahim.
68. PST, p. 468. The PRI was incorporated into the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia 
(Pesindo) in 1946. Under the auspices o f Amir Sjarifuddin then Minister of 
Information, a group o f pemuda had been sent from Java to Sumatra at the end of 
October 1945. Kamal and Karim Halim headed an 80-man contingent which came to 
West Sumatra. ( Ibid. , pp. 94-95.) Kamal attended the Pemuda Congress in 1945 
at Jogja, and he headed the Kongres Rakjat o f West Sumatra held in Padang Pan- 
djang on November 2. PST, pp. 103-4; Semangat Merdeka, October 27, 1945.
69. Several of these organizations were strengthened by the return in December of
prewar Minangkabau leaders who had been exiled to Digul and had spent most of 
the war in Australia. These included H. Iljas Jacub and Djalaluddin Thaib, 
former leaders of Permi (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia), the radical modernist 
Islamic party which had emerged in West Sumatra in the late 1920s; Hadji Datuk 
Batuah, the Islamic communist leader o f the 1920s who became one o f the leaders
o f the PKI; and Dt. Singo Maradjo o f the PSII. Other Sumatrans returning from
exile included Burhanoeddin and Datuk Bendaro. PST, pp. 106, 459; Tamar Djaja, 
Pusaka Indonesia (Bandung: Kementerian Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan 
Republik Indonesia, 1952), pp. 370-72; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Move­
ment in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 
78, 156; Semangat Merdeka, November 3, 1945.
70. The Hizbullah was headed by Abdul Rasjid Sutan Mansur and was formed on November
25, 1945. The Sabilillah, which was half its size, according to Hamka, was 
under the nominal leadership o f Mohammad Djamil Djambek and Daud Rasjidi (re­
spectively eighty-five and sixty-five years old at the time). A. R. St. Mansur 
was bom in 1895 at Manindjau o f an ulama family. He had been a follower of
Hadji Rusul and had taught in his school at Padang Pandjang. He became head of
the Muhammadijah in Minangkabau in 1930, and pursued a policy of making the 
organization increasingly nonpolitical. (See Abdullah, Schools and P olitics ,
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important were the communist m ilita ry  groups, the Barisan Merah, t ie d  
to  the PKI, and the S a if fu l la h , a l l ie d  w ith the PKI Lokal Is la m .71
The f i r s t  h a lf  o f  1946 was marked by armed d isturbances in  East 
and North Sumatra, where u p ris in gs against the lo c a l  rajahs led  to  con­
s id era b le  bloodshed and breakdown o f  a u th ority . The v io le n ce  spread as 
fa r  as T a p a n u li,72 but in West Sumatra the main repercu ssion s were in 
the p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d .  The reasons fo r  th is  d ivergence are perhaps o b v i­
ous, but are probably worth r e s ta t in g . The two p r in c ip a l d if fe re n ce s  
were th a t, f i r s t ,  as has been noted above, Indonesians in  West Sumatra 
were under fa r  le s s  pressure from the A ll ie d  fo r c e s ;  and the return o f  
Dutch adm in istrators ou tsid e  o f  the immediate co a s ta l enclave o f  Padang 
seemed much le s s  im m inent.73 74 Thus, although there was con s id erab le  
d is s a t is fa c t io n  over the European presence and the compromises with the 
Dutch being made by the lead ersh ip  o f  the r e p u b lic , both on Sumatra and 
Java, there was as yet no sense o f  strong  pressure that demanded an 
immediate response. More im portant at th is  stage was the d if fe r e n t  
economic and s o c ia l  environment in  West Sumatra, where in d iv id u a l la rg e - 
s ca le  landownership was rare and s o c ia l  in e q u a lit ie s  le ss  pronounced, 
and where there were few obvious ta rgets  on whom hungry and d isp laced  
people cou ld  vent th e ir  w ra th .71* M oreover, in  con tra st to  East Sumatra 
the Minangkabau p opu lation  was e th n ic a l ly  homogeneous and the system o f  
s o c ia l  org a n iza tion  in  West Sumatra tended to  make i t  e a s ie r  fo r  d i s ­
s a t is fa c t io n s  to f in d  channels through n on vio len t means.
D is s a t is fa c t io n  and pressure fo r  change were n everth e less  there 
but i t  was w ith in  the re s id e n c y 's  l e g is la t iv e  body, the KNI Sumatera 
B arat, that moves were made to meet the demands. At i t s  meeting on 
March 14, 1946, the KNI set up a V o lk s fro n t , modeled on the Persatuan
pp. 65-69, 165-66.) He was one o f the organizers of the Hizbullah as a military 
arm o f the Muhammadijah and was its firs t  commander. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, 
pp. 334-35.) He was to become head of the Muhammadijah during the 1950s. By 
1946 both the Hizbullah and Sabilillah were tied organizationally to the Masjumi 
party. Ibid. , pp. 334, 360; PST, pp. 474-75; Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia, pp. 285, 
290, 308, 312; Raliby, Documenta, pp. 136-37; Abdullah, Schools and P olitics , 
p. 166; Semangat Merdeka, December 1, 1945.
71. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 335. The leader of the Saiffullah was Abdul Gani 
S ja rif.
72. Semangat Merdeka, March 13, 1946.
73. See, however, Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 66-67, where he 
stresses the relative weakness o f the Dutch in East Sumatra at this period.
74. This does not mean that poverty and hunger were not widespread in West Sumatra 
during the early months o f the revolution. There was a severe rice shortage 
there, which caused increasing dissatisfaction from the end o f 1945 (Nefis 
Publicatie, No. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 [IC-RVO], p. 24). In 
his travels around the region in the early part o f 1946 Hamka noted that the 
most hard-hit areas were near Solok and Alahan Pandjang, where many died o f 
hunger, and from his own observations he estimated that about 75 percent o f the 
population wore clothes o f tree bark (baju kulit kayu) as often occurred in 
Java. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 314.) The extent of the hardship can be seen 
from the deficits in rice production from 1943-47. After a surplus in 1942, 
there was a deficit o f 28,815 tons in 1943; 47,539 tons in 1944; 160,468 in 
1945; 154,475 tons in 1946, and 108,723 tons in 1947. There are no figures for 
the later years. PST, p. 651.
91
Perdjuangan formed by Tan Malaka on Java in January o f  that y e a r .75 
Although the f r o n t 's  lead ers were m ostly drawn from the KNI i t s e l f ,  
they were a l l  from the more ra d ica l component, co n s is t in g  o f  members o f  
the youth and la b or  groups, and s o c i a l i s t  and communist p a r t i e s .76 The 
org a n iza tion  was d iv id ed  in to  a s e r ie s  o f  co u n c ils  rep resen tin g  the 
d i f fe r e n t  luhak (the t r a d it io n a l Minangkabau d iv is io n s )  and d is t r i c t s  
o f  West Sumatra. Control over the "Fonds Kemerdekaan" and over the 
r e g io n 's  economy was tra n s fe rred  from the KNI to  the V o lk s fr o n t . 77
In the p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d ,  the V o lk s fr o n t 's  a ction s  were immediately 
marked by an in tra n s ig en t stance toward the A ll ie d  fo r c e s .  Demands 
v o iced  by the body on March 24 p a r a lle le d  those being issued  by fron ts  
in  oth er parts o f  Indon esia , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  East Sumatra,78 namely:
(1) that "a ll  Dutchmen under p ro te c t io n  o f  the B r it is h  should be su r­
rendered to  the TRI; (2) a l l  Indonesians a rrested  by the B r it ish  should 
be surrendered to  the repu blican  p o l ic e  f o r c e ;  (3) the B r it ish  must r e ­
quest from the Indonesian res id en t in Padang any su p p lies  they needed 
from West Sumatra; (4) the o f f i c e  b u ild in g  o f  the res id en t o f  the 
R epublic o f  Indonesia in Padang should be returned by the B r it is h ;
(5) the sa fe ty  o f  B r it is h  s o ld ie r s  and v e h ic le s  ou tsid e  o f  Padang could  
no lon ger be guaranteed; and (6) the res id en t should issu e  an order 
that a l l  accom plices and h elp ers o f  the NICA be rem oved.79
The V o lk s fr o n t 's  p r in c ip a l a c t io n s , however, were in  the economic 
f i e l d ,  in a d r a s t ic  attempt to  curb the in f la t io n  that was raging in 
the reg ion . But the chaos re su lt in g  from these steps led  the res id en t 
to  ov errid e  th e ir  orders and d is s o lv e  the fro n t  l i t t l e  more than a 
month a fte r  i t  had been e s ta b lish e d . The in f la t io n  in  West Sumatra was 
being exacerbated  by the number o f  100 rupiah Japanese notes which the 
Dutch were rep orted ly  flo o d in g  in to  the area , and i t  was around the 
problem o f  th is  paper currency that the V o lk sfron t cen tered  i t s  a c t io n s . 
On A p ril 1 i t  d eclared  that w ith in  a month the 100 rupiah note would no 
lon ger be le g a l cu rren cy , and that b e fo re  the end o f  that p eriod  a l l  
100 rupiah notes should be exchanged at the banks fo r  notes o f  sm aller 
denom inations. As rep u b lican  currency had not yet been c ir c u la te d , 
th is  led  to  an insupportable  demand fo r  the sm aller denom inational 
n o te s , which the banks cou ld  not meet. The s itu a t io n  was fu rth er  ag­
gravated by two oth er fa c t o r s :  news o f  the reg u la tion  reached the
towns b e fore  the cou n try s id e , so that many o f  the unwanted notes got 
d ep osited  in  ru ra l areas; the reg u la tion  app lied  only to  West Sumatra 
so that sp ecu la tors  from other a reas, p a r t ic u la r ly  the southern part 
o f  Tapanuli, c a p ita liz e d  on the s itu a t io n . This led  to  a fu rth er  regu­
75. Sumatran Governor Hasan was present at the meeting. Semangat Merdeka, March 20, 
1946.
76. The seven-man leadership council was made up of Barium A.S. (PBI), Bachtaruddin 
(PKI), Chatib Suleiman (Partai S osia lis), Iskandar Tedjasukmana (Partai Sosia- 
l i s ) , Suleiman (PRI), Basjrah Lubis (SOBSI), and a high o ffic ia l whose name was 
not published. PST, pp. 113, 479.
77. Their firs t  action was to forbid the collection o f taxes by any body other than 
the Volksfront.
78. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in IC-RVO, p. 10.
79. PST, pp. 115-16.
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la t io n , banning a l l  t r a f f i c  w ith Tapanuli, and a law by which no one 
cou ld  possess more than 500 rupiah in c a s h .80
The immediate economic chaos re su lt in g  from these measures led  the 
res id en t to overru le  the V o lk s fro n t, issu in g  a reg u la tion  as ea r ly  as 
A p ril 5 that the 100 rupiah note was s t i l l  le g a l currency . C o n flic t in g  
orders were issued  by the res id en t and the fron t  through most o f  A p r i l , 
w ith the popu lation  unsure which o f  the two had le g a l a u th o r ity .81 
F in a lly  a fte r  a meeting o f  a l l  the Sumatran re s id e n ts , attended by a 
d e lega tion  from the cen tra l government in J o g ja , the leaders o f  the 
V olk sfron t were a rrested  on A p ril 2 4 .82
This severe a c t io n , however, appears to have had l i t t l e  in the way 
o f  rep ercu ss ion s , p o s s ib ly  because o f  the homogeneity between the lea d ­
ers o f  the V olk sfron t and the KNI. The s ix  men were re lea sed  a month 
la t e r  on May 22, were given an opportun ity  to a ir  th e ir  grievances b e ­
fo re  the f u l l  KNI, and were re in corp ora ted  in to  i t s  le a d e r s h ip .83
The va riega ted  d isturbances in the d i f fe r e n t  parts o f  Sumatra d id , 
however, have long-term  e f fe c t s  on the adm in istra tive  o rga n iza tion  o f  
the is la n d , a le r t in g  the p ro v in c ia l and cen tra l governments to the 
dangers o f  the s itu a t io n  th ere . They led  to the f i r s t  v i s i t  by a cen­
t r a l  government d e leg a tion  to  the is la n d 84 and to attempts to r e s tr u c ­
ture the Sumatran adm in istration  in a way b e t te r  su ited  to the r e a l i ­
t ie s  o f  the lo c a l  s itu a t io n  on the is la n d . These changes were made at 
a l l  le v e ls  from the prov ince down to the n e g e r i. In an attempt to  in ­
s t i t u t io n a l iz e  t ie s  between Sumatra and Java, the cen tra l government
80. A fu ll account o f the economic situation in March-April 1946 can be found in 
ib id ., pp. 116-21, 125.
81. On the influence of the Volksfront, see ib id . , pp. 479-80; Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, 
Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia (Djakarta: n .p ., n .d .), II, p. 97. He does not, 
however, mention the arrest o f the front's leaders and attributes its  failure 
to differences amongst its  members. See also Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 337; 
Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 235-37.
82. The central government delegation arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17 and attend­
ed the inaugural meeting o f the KNI Sumateri April 17-20. (Raliby, Documenta, 
pp. 296-99.) At a meeting with the governor, the residents and the central gov­
ernment delegation, the Volksfront, on April 21, promised to stand behind the 
government and take no steps without its  agreement. However, "the conflict and 
problem o f prestige between the government and the Volksfront" led the West 
Sumatran government on April 24 to arrest all six o f its  leaders. (The "high 
o ffic ia l whose name was not published" was apparently not arrested.) PST, p. 
125. To meet the problems of the m ilitary's food supplies, a 10 percent tax 
was imposed on all crop yields. In addition, the central government promised 
development money, providing in itia lly  250 million rupiah to Sumatra as a whole, 
and later 500 million rupiah. Ibid. , p. 127.
83. Ibid. , pp. 386-88, 481.
84. The delegation (including Minister o f Defense Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister o f In­
formation M. Natsir, Minister o f Religion H. Rasjidi, and Mr. Hermani, repre­
senting the Ministry o f Internal Affairs) went firs t  to East Sumatra, and 
arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17, leaving there probably on April 21. Ibid. , 
p. 121; Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-97; Semangat Merdeka, April 10, 1946.
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d e leg a tion  oversaw establishm ent o f  a Sumatran KNI, whose delegates 
would represent the is la n d  in the KNI Pusat on J a v a .85
At the p rov in ce  le v e l  a 100-member Dewan Perwakilan Sumatera was 
crea ted , made up o f  KNI rep resen ta tiv es  from each o f  the r e s id e n c ie s .86 
At the same time Governor Hasan, f in a l ly  recogn iz in g  the im p o s s ib ility  
o f  e f f e c t iv e ly  adm in istering Sumatra as a s in g le  u n it , agreed to  the 
establishm ent o f  three su bprovin ces, North, Central and South Sumatra, 
each with a deputy governor. The subprovince o f  Central Sumatra in c o r ­
porated  the re s id e n c ie s  o f  West Sumatra, Djambi and R ia u .87 Creation 
o f  the subprovince o f  Central Sumatra led  to the fou rth  change o f  r e s i ­
dent in West Sumatra s in ce  the Independence Proclam ation . Dr. Djamil 
(who had rep laced  Perpatih  Baringek on March 18 when the la t t e r  was r e ­
c a lle d  to Medan to take over an adm in istra tive  p ost there) was appointed 
deputy governor o f  Central Sumatra, and h is  p la ce  as res id en t o f  West 
Sumatra was taken by Mr. S t. M. R asjid  on July 2 0 .88
Together with these changes, Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (R egional De­
fense C ouncils) were created  in  each o f  the r e s id e n c ie s . These coun­
c i l s  complemented the Dewan Pertahanan Negara at the n a tion a l le v e l ,  
and th e ir  aim was to co n so lid a te  the lead ersh ip  o f  the c i v i l  adm inis­
t r a t io n , the army, and the Mp eo p le M in to  a s in g le  body. In West Suma­
tra  the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah was headed by Resident R a s jid , w ith 
Army D iv is ion a l Commander Dahlan Djambek as h is  d ep u ty .89
85. Raliby, Document a, pp. 297-98; G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 181-83.
86. Representatives from West Sumatra were: Chatib Suleiman, Aziz Chan, Darwis
Ma*roef, Rangkajo Rasuna Said, Bariun A.S., Sidi Bakaruddin, Bagindo M. Tahir, 
Abdullah, Dt. Simaradjo, Bachtaruddin, Mr. M. Nasroen, Jacoeb Rasjid, S jarif 
Said, Sultani St. Malako, Mr. Nazaruddin, Marzuki Jatim, H. M. Joenoes, Roestam 
Thaib, A. Gafar Djambek. (PST, pp. 122-23.) The body met only three times be­
fore it  was dissolved in the reorganization o f 1948.
87. Governor Hasan had decided to move the Sumatra capital from Medan to Pematang 
Siantar on March 22. Semangat Merdeka, March 29, 1946. The levels below the 
residency were kabupaten (luhak); kewedanaan; ketjamatan (demang muda); and 
desa (negeri). Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-99; PST, p. 123.
88. On the succession of residents of West Sumatra, Hamka writes that "the govern­
ment firs t  appointed Sjafei, but apparently the violent situation caused by the 
Allied landing and the kepanasan ra'ayat could not be overcome by that gentle 
soul. Then the Komite Nasional decided to appoint Dt. Perpatih Baringek. An 
old man who during the Dutch period had only the soul o f a clerk (mengenal jiwa 
kantor) , he was also unable to deal with the situation. He then was replaced by 
Dr. M. Djamil. Then Dr. Djamil was appointed subgovernor o f Central Sumatra, 
and Mr. St. Mohd. Rasjid was named resident. He lasted a long time." Hamka, 
Kenang^kenangan, p. 337. Rasjid was born in 1911 in Pariaman, finally graduat­
ing from the Sekolah Hakim Tinggi in Djakarta in 1938. From 1939-41 he was a 
lawyer in Bukittinggi and Padang. He was in Djakarta from 1942 until 1944 when 
he again returned to West Sumatra. Kementerian Penerangan, Kami Perkenalkan. p. 
59.
89. PST, pp. 131-32. Its other members were Dr. A. Rahim Usman, Duski Samad, Bach­
taruddin (formerly o f the Volksfront) and Abdullah. (On Duski Samad, who was a 
younger brother o f A. R. Sutan Mansur and had been a Permi leader in the early 
1930s, see Abdullah, Schools and P o litics , pp. 124, 168; Noer, Modernist Muslim 
Movement, p. 156; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 313.
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Plans fo r  e s ta b lish in g  Dewan Perwakilan (R epresentative C ouncils) 
at the n egeri le v e l  were f i r s t  put forward at the mid-March sess ion  o f  
the KNI a fte r  the d e c is io n  to  form the V o lk s fro n t. The move was aimed 
at removing lo c a l  power from the s o le  hands o f  the t r a d it io n a l adat 
group and reap portion in g  i t  among rep resen ta tiv es  o f  various orga n iza ­
t ion s  and p a r t i e s .90 E le ct ion s  were held  in  West Sumatra on June 25 
fo r  the Dewan Perwakilan Negeri and on July 10 fo r  the w ali n e g e r i .91 
I t  is  with resp ect to these e le c t io n s  that the account in the Propinsi 
s t a t e s :
In these fifteen historic days there were great efforts in the direc­
tion of democratizing the administration o f the negeri, so that auton­
omy reached down in West Sumatra, connecting directly with the people.
And with this great step, that was carried out without any instruc­
tions from the Central Government, R .I., clashes and spilling of 
blood were prevented, and the great revolution went forward safely 
and peacefully.92
However, in  an adm in istra tive  sense these n egeri were too  sm all to 
assume the r o le s  envisaged fo r  them: o f  c o n tr o l l in g  th e ir  own economy 
and d ealing  with th e ir  own a f f a i r s .  Over the next y ea r , they were 
gradu ally  grouped in to  wilajah autonoom , and by November 1948, the 
o r ig in a l 542 n egeri formed 21 autonomous n egeri b e s a r .93 94
There was a lso  a reorg a n iza tion  o f  the Sumatran m ilita ry  command 
published  on July 3, 1946, whereby Sumatra was d iv id ed  in to  three sub­
commands: Subcommand I fo r  South Sumatra, headed by A. K. Gani; Sub­
command II fo r  Central Sumatra under Dahlan Djambek; and Subcommand III  
fo r  North Sumatra under Teuku Mohd. Daud S ja h .9lf Subcommand I con ­
s is te d  o f  Garuda D iv is ion  I under B arlia n , and Garuda D iv is ion  II under 
Bambang U t o jo .95 (In  December 1946 Simbolon rep laced  Gani as head o f
90. One-fifth of the candidates for election were to be nominated from each o f the
following five groups: (1) the penhulu and alim ulama; (2) the negeri branch
of the KNI (mostly adat leaders); (3) a meeting o f the local branch o f the KNI 
that was to be attended by at least 100 male members o f the electorate; (4) a 
meeting of at least 100 female electors; (5) the p olitica l parties. PST, p.
339. The MTKAAM at its  congress of April 15 objected to the resident about the 
new measures, but he supported the KNI decision. Ibid. , p. 330.
91. The election law of May 21 appears in PST, pp. 331-36. There were to be nine 
representatives for the firs t  thousand members o f a negeri and two representa­
tives for each additional thousand. Thus a negeri with a population o f 7,000 
would have a DPN of twenty-one members. These DPNs were then to nominate four 
candidates for the position o f wali negeri to be voted on in the July 10 elec- 
tions. Ibid. , pp. 338-40.
92. Ibid. , p. 340. It should be remembered that this was written in the early 1950s 
when there was considerable tension between West Sumatra and the central govern­
ment over the matter o f local autonomy.
93. Ibid., pp. 340-42.
94. Ibid. , p. 568. The reorganization was apparently not completed until February 
1947 (Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah TNI Angkatan Darat 1945- 
1965 [Bandung: Pussemad, 1965], p. 25), but the subcommands in at least Central 
and South Sumatra came into existence by mid-1946.
95. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 319.
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Subcommand I , ) 96 Subcommand I II  was d iv ided  in to  Gadjah I (A tjeh  under 
Husin Jusuf) and Gadjah II (East Sumatra under Ahmad T a h ir ). Subcom­
mand II was d iv id ed  in to  Banteng I (Tapanuli under Pandapotan Sitompul) 
and Banteng II (West Sumatra) under Ismael Lengah.97 The Banteng d iv i ­
s ion  i t s e l f  now became D iv is ion  IX Banteng TRI Sumatra Command.98
The Return o f  the Dutch and the March 3 A f fa ir
These org a n iza tion a l changes were taking p la ce  against a back­
ground o f  the gradual displacem ent o f  B r it ish  and Indian fo rce s  in  and 
around the town o f  Padang by those o f  the D utch .99 Clashes between the 
Indonesians and A ll ie d  fo r ce s  in creased  sharply in J u ly , reaching a 
peak a fte r  the takeover o f  repu blican  adm in istra tive  o f f i c e s  in the 
c i t y  by B r it ish  and Dutch f o r c e s .100 This v io le n t  Indonesian re a ctio n  
caused the A l l ie s  to a rrest  the West Sumatra res id en t Mr. R a s jid , and 
the head o f  the Padang p o l i c e ,  Johnny Anwar, re lea s in g  them only in 
response to the p ro te s ts  o f  Deputy Governor D ja m il.101 From the middle 
o f  March B r it ish  fo r ce s  in Padang had co n s is te d  o f  only one sm all b r i ­
gade, and th e ir  m ilita ry  p o s it io n , p a r t ic u la r ly  around the a i r f i e ld  and 
the port o f  Teluk B ajur, was extrem ely tenuou s.102 However, the Indone­
96. Ibid., p. 321.
97. Ismael Lengah replaced Djambek, who was promoted to head Subcommand II (Nasu- 
tion, TNI, I, p. 327). There was a reorganization within the Banteng division 
during 1946. The headquarters o f Regiment II was moved from Sawah Lunto to 
Sungai Penuh, later under command of Lt. Col. Thalib who replaced Dahlan Ibra­
him who now became the Banteng division chief o f sta ff. Its responsibility was 
for the southern front, with battalions at Sungai Penuh and Painan. The head­
quarters of Regiment III was moved from Lubuk Alung to Solok, under Lt. Col. A. 
Husein, with responsibility for the eastern front. Its battalions were at 
Indarung, Bukit Kompong and Pajakumbuh. Regiment I maintained its headquarters 
at Bukittinggi, with responsibility for the northern front. It was now under 
A. Halim, as Sjarif Usman had been named to a sta ff position with the central 
command. Its battalions were at Bukittinggi, Padang Pandjang and Pariaman. A 
battalion "Teras" was formed from elements o f the lasjkar rakjat around Padang 
and it  became Battalion 4 o f Regiment III (East) under command of Maj. Sjuib
in November 1946. Ibid. , p. 323; PST, pp. 564, 568; Tokoh2 Parlemen, p. 188; 
Simbolon, Report, p. 162.
98. PST, p. 569.
99. The firs t  two months of 1946 were relatively quiet in Padang, so some of the 
Allied forces were transferred to Palembang. On a v is it  to Sumatra in April 
1946, Adm. Mountbatten ordered all SEAC forces to be withdrawn as soon as 
Allied prisoners of war and the remaining Japanese could be evacuated. It was 
estimated that this would take about two months, with authority to be trans­
ferred to the Dutch in both Java and Sumatra by July 1. (Mountbatten, Post 
Surrender, pp. 300, 309.) The transfer, however, took over four months longer.
100. Raliby, Documenta, p. 367.
101. PST, pp. 133-34. According to Raliby (Documenta, p. 370), they were released 
on August 9 after several days* detention.
102. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 322. He states that the a irfield  was pock-marked by fire  
from Indonesian arms, and that both it  and the port could have been overrun had
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sian  attacks were apparently g en era lly  spontaneous and uncoord inated , 
being launched la rg e ly  by the non-TNI fo r c e s ,  with the excep tion  o f  one 
major b a tt le  in Padang at the end o f  August, led  by Dahlan Djam bek.103
In response to the takeover o f  the Padang adm in istration  o f f i c e s  
by the Dutch, most o f  the remaining leaders o f  the residen cy  adm inis­
t r a t io n , togeth er w ith th e ir  o f f i c e s  were withdrawn to Kajutanam and 
B u k itt in g g i. A rep u b lican  presence was, however, maintained in the 
town, w ith Aziz Chan assuming the p ost o f  mayor in the middle o f  
A ugust.104 At the beginning o f  September the A l l ie s  announced that SEAC 
fo rce s  would f in a l ly  be withdrawn from Indonesia by November 30 and 
that au th ority  would be handed over to the Netherlands Indies C iv il  Ad­
m in is tra t io n . 105
The month fo llo w in g  the i n i t i a l l i n g  o f  the L in ggad jati Agreement 
on November 15, a cen tra l government d e leg a tion  co n s is t in g  o f  Amir 
S ja r ifu d d in , A. K. Gani and Lt. Gen. Oerip Soemohardjo came to West 
Sumatra to  work out i t s  im plementation t h e r e .106 A s e r ie s  o f  meetings 
were held  from December 11 to 31, between th is  d e le g a tio n , West Sumatra 
m ilita ry  and c iv i l i a n  le a d e rs , and rep resen ta tiv es  from the Dutch s id e , 
concerning the m od a lities  o f  a c e a s e - f ir e  and establishm ent o f  a demar­
ca tion  lin e  between Dutch and Indonesian fo r c e s .  Major disagreement 
arose over the issue o f  Dutch re fu sa l to  return Indonesian p r iso n e rs , 
and over the Indonesian in s is te n ce  on m aintaining a repu blican  town 
adm in istration  in  Padang supported by a s iz e a b le  Indonesian p o l ic e  
fo r ce  to  m aintain s e c u r it y .107 N egotia tion s broke down over these i s ­
sues on December 31, and h o s t i l i t i e s  were b r i e f ly  resumed, but agree­
ment was f in a l ly  reached in  the middle o f  January with the Dutch 
a ccep tin g  the presence o f  500 armed rep u b lican  p o l ic e  w ith in  the town. 
From th is  p o in t r e la t io n s  between the Dutch and the residen cy  adm inis­
tra t io n  appear to  have improved, w ith many elements o f  the government 
togeth er w ith armed p o l ic e  return ing from B u k ittin gg i to  Padang by 
A p r i l . 108
However, there was evident d is s a t is fa c t io n  in West Sumatra with 
the lo c a l  and n a tion a l lead ersh ip  and the compromises they were reaching
there been an organized attack by the combined lasjkar and TRI forces. After 
the departure of the 71 Indian Brigade and 1 Lincolns, the main SEAC force in 
Padang until August appears to have been the 8/8 Punjab Regiment. Singh, Post- 
War Occupation Forces, pp. 243-44.
103. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 323; PST, pp. 136-37. With his assumption of command of 
the Banteng division Ismael Lengah attempted to coordinate and direct the scat­
tered attacks. Some had clearly been directed against the Chinese community 
which had formed a Barisan Poh An Tui to safeguard its security (PST, p. 138). 
It appears that the Poh An Tui had been formed in Padang during the early 
spring of 1946. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289
in IC-RVO, p. 28.
104. PST, pp. 132-35. 105. Ibid., p. 137.
106. Ibid. , p. 139. Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 240. On interpretations o f the Lingga­
djati Agreement see Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United 
Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 28-34.
107. PST, pp. 144-46.
108. Ibid. , pp. 150-51. Cease-fire lines were only finally agreed on in May.
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with the Dutch. An atmosphere o f  su sp ic ion  apparently grew up in the 
ea rly  months o f  1947, w ith charges launched that lead ing members o f  the 
residen cy  were a ctin g  as anjing NICA.1^  At the beginning o f  March 
w hile a stormy KNIP was meeting at Malang, w ith a number o f  the West 
Sumatran leaders p re se n t,109 10 and was f in a l ly  agreeing to r a t i fy  the 
L in ggad jati Agreement, a group c a l l in g  i t s e l f  the Pembanteras Anti 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PAKI) launched an attempted coup in  B u k ittin g g i.
This a c t io n , which became known as the March 3 A f fa ir ,  aimed at 
kidnapping the West Sumatra res id en t and Banteng d iv is io n  commander; 
but the attacks on both th e ir  residen ces were re p e lle d  by guards. The 
PAKI d id , however, succeed in  kidnapping Eni Karim, A. G affar Djambek 
and Anwar St. S a id i ,111 togeth er with severa l other members o f  the ad­
m in istra tion  and armed fo r c e s ,  and in  the attacks one government s o l ­
d ie r  was k i l le d  and one o f  the a ttack ers wounded. The government 
rea sserted  co n tro l the fo llo w in g  day, fre e in g  the p rison ers  and a r r e s t ­
ing the PAKI le a d e rs . P r in c ip a l among these were Saalah Jusuf St. 
Mangkuto and D t. Radjo Mangkuto, and the group included elements from 
the H izbullah and S a b i l i l la h  fo r c e s ,  as w ell as some young members o f  
the Sumatra M ilita ry  Command S e c r e ta r ia t .112
109. Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 243. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 338. He writes: "Mem­
bers of the administration accused party leaders o f being NICA. Party leaders 
accused government o ffic ia ls  o f being NICA. Mr. Rasjid, NICA; Ismael Lengah, 
Divisional Commander, NICA. Aziz Chan who had become Mayor of Padang, which 
was occupied by the Dutch military, NICA; Johnny Anwar, Head o f Padang police, 
because his father was formerly a Demang, NICA. And those who made these accu­
sations were themselves accused by others as NICA."
110. There was a total delegation from Sumatra of 50, which included 15 representa­
tives from West Sumatra. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 97; PST, p. 
388. The five Sumatran delegates elected at Malang to the KNIP working commit­
tee on March 3 were I. Tedjasukmana (PSI), Zainal Baharudin (PSI), Luat Siregar 
(PKI), Njonja Rasuna Said, and Zainal Abidin Achman. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 
205-6. (Rasuna Said had been a member of the women*s branch of Permi in the 
1930s, Abdullah, Schools and P olitics , pp. 194, 196-98.)
111. PST, p. 148; Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 244; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 343. Eni 
Karim was a member of the residency secretariat; A. Gaffar Djambek was bupati 
of Pajakumbuh and a leading member o f the KNI, and Anwar St. Saidi a former 
director of the National Bank in Bukittinggi and a member of the KNI.
112. Amongst others arrested in the affair Hamka names: Guru Adam, BB; Sjamsuddin
Ahmad; Hadji Marusin; Kapten Anwar; Sersan Mayor Julius (military police);
Saibi Ismail; Burhanuddin St. Larangan; Tarok; a military policeman from Paja­
kumbuh; and Harun Rajo Sampono, a member of the PKI from Silungkang. Ibid. , 
pp. 339, 363. S. J. Sutan Mangkuto, who is referred to in all accounts as a 
former bupati o f Solok, was a leading member of the Muhammadijah in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and of the KNI Sumatera Barat since its formation. He must there­
fore have been a member o f the H5kokai during the Japanese period. On the im­
portance o f his role during the 1920s and 1930s see Abdullah, Schools and 
P olitics , pp. 60, 66, 84-85, 90-95. Datu Radjo Mangkuto was a member o f the 
BPPI in Padang at the end of August 1945, and had led efforts to merge this 
group with the PRI. Sjamsuddin Ahmad was one of the founders of the Hizbullah 
in 1945, and was commander of its Central Sumatra division in February 1946. 
(PST, pp. 553-54.) Captain Anwar was possibly the Muhammad Anwar who commanded 
Regiment IV o f this division. H. Marusin appears later in Hamka*s memoirs as a 
member of a dissatisfied Hizbullah group in a village outside of Padang Pandjang 
during the second Dutch action. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 409.) I have been 
unable to find references to the others.
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This a f fa i r  ra ised  alarm p a r t ic u la r ly  amongst the Masjumi and army 
le a d e rs . I t  may a lso  have re in fo r ce d  the d is p o s it io n  o f  Sumatra le a d ­
ers to  fo llo w  the in i t ia t iv e  launched on Java to  bring  m ilita ry  e l e ­
ments ou tsid e  o f  the TNI in to  i t s  o f f i c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .113 14 Early news 
reaching the KNIP in  Malang on the in c id en t rep orted  that i t  had been 
the West Sumatra Masjumi lead ersh ip  which had in i t ia t e d  the coup, so 
that N atsir immediately ordered  Masjumi leaders Marzuki Jatim , A. R.
S t. Mansur (head o f  the H izbullah) and Udin back to  B u k ittin gg i to  in ­
v e s t ig a te , and .h im self led  a d e leg a tion  to  the area on March 2 3 .111* 
D esp ite , or because o f ,  th is  concern there seems to  have been co n s id e r ­
able understanding o f  the m otives o f  the PAKI, and because the in v e s t i ­
ga tion  dragged out in to  the summer the le a d e rs ' m isgivings regarding 
L in ggad ja ti appeared borne out by the f i r s t  Dutch " p o l ic e  a c t io n "  
launched on July 21. When they were f in a l ly  sentenced at the end o f  
August, only D t. Radjo Mangkuto was sent to  j a i l  f o r  a y ea r , w ith the 
other re ce iv in g  e ith e r  suspended sentences or  being freed  d i r e c t ly .  115
Attempts to  Unify Sumatran R esista n ce : 1947
Whatever impetus they re ce iv ed  from the March 3 A f fa i r ,  there were 
major attempts on Sumatra beginning in the spring  o f  1947 to  e s ta b lis h  
u n if ie d  o rg a n iz a t io n s --b o th  m ilita ry  and c iv i l ia n - -w h ic h  would in c o r ­
porate the d isp arate  groups and p a r tie s  that had p r o l i fe r a t e d  s in ce  the 
la t t e r  part o f  1945. I t  appears c le a r  that the prime m ission  o f  V ice - 
President Hatta during h is  extended stay  in  Sumatra beginning in  June 
o f  that y ea r, was to  u n ify  the d iverse  anti-D utch movements on the 
is la n d , and to  bring  the s tru gg le  in  Sumatra as a whole in  lin e  with 
the p o l i c ie s  o f  the repu blican  government on Java. Although these u n i­
f i c a t io n  steps began during the sp rin g , i t  was the f i r s t  Dutch " p o l ic e  
a c t io n "  o f  July 21 which provided  the needed stim ulus fo r  the lo c a l  
groups them selves to  cooperate  with the government and army lead ersh ip  
towards such an end.
In th e ir  attack  the Dutch employed sm aller fo r ce s  on Sumatra than 
on J a v a ,116 and in  West Sumatra i t  was th e ir  Brigade U which moved out 
from Padang attack in g  along the three main roads to the n orth , east and 
south o f  the c i t y .117 A ll these op eration s were e ith e r  notably  lim ited
113. A decision had already been reached on November 26, 1946, between the Hizbullah 
and Sabilillah to unify their forces. PST, p. 560.
114. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338-39. They decided that the Masjumi leadership 
had not initiated the a ffair. Natsir's stated opinion o f the attempted coup 
was that it  was a mixture o f good and bad. PST, p. 149.
115. Hamka was appointed to defend all the accused leaders. Their tria l was to have 
begun on July 17, but Hamka gained a postponement because the fasting month was 
to start on July 20. The defendants were on bail until their tria l at the end 
o f August. Hamka's account o f the affair is found in Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338- 
45, 362-69.
116. Three Dutch brigades were employed on Sumatra as opposed to three divisions on 
Java. (Nasution, TNI, II [Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968], p. 89.) Brigade Z 
attacked from Medan, and Brigade Y from Palembang. (Ibid. , p. 90.) See also 
Charles Wolf, The Indonesian Story (New York: The John Day Co., 1948), p. 132.
117. Two days before the attack the mayor o f Padang, Aziz Chan, was killed, appar­
ently by the Dutch, though they blamed an Indonesian "extremist group." It is








T erritory con tro lled  by the Dutch before July 21, 1947.
T erritory  occupied by the Dutch a fter  the f i r s t  m ilitary  
action (July 21, 1947).
Territory held by the Republic up to the second m ilitary 
action (December 18, 1948).










































or u n su ccess fu l. The Dutch advanced fu rth e s t  on the northern fr o n t , 
where they were i n i t i a l l y  h a lted  about fo r t y  k ilom eters from the c i t y  
and f in a l ly  r e t ir e d  to  e s ta b lis h  p o s it io n s  at Lubuk Alung, 23 k ilom e­
te rs  north o f  Padang. On the eastern  fro n t  they advanced only as fa r  
as Indarung (re tre a t in g  by the end o f  the month to  Padang's eastern  
b ou n d a ries), and to  the south they were stopped short o f  Siguntur Tua, 
both towns w ith in  f i f t e e n  k ilom eters o f  Padang.* 118
It is  p o s s ib le  that the Dutch command d id  not employ as large  a 
fo r ce  in West Sumatra as i t  d id  in  East and South, and that i t s  aim 
there was merely to  secure co n tro l over the Padang p la in .119 The lack  
o f  economic p r iz e s ,  such as the p la n ta tion  area around Medan and the 
o i l  f i e ld s  near Palembang, that cou ld  be gained by a w ider occu pation  
would argue fo r  t h is .  C le a r ly , the geography o f  the area played a r o le  
in  th e ir  lim ited  advance, w ith the Dutch fo r ce s  being h a lted  as soon as 
they approached the mountains, th is  probably  accounting fo r  the grea ter  
extent o f  th e ir  p rogress to  the n orth .120 Whatever the reasons, the 
fa c t  that a fte r  th is  a c t io n  the Dutch occu pation  fo r ce s  were s t i l l  con­
fin ed  to  an area o f  about 15 k ilom eters around the town o f  Padang, and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  that a l l  other towns, notab ly  B u k itt in g g i, remained in 
republican  hands, must have had an e f f e c t  on the a ttitu d e s  o f  the people 
o f  West Sumatra. These fe e lin g s  would have been accentuated by the fa c t  
that the Dutch fo r c e s  in  North Sumatra had occu pied  Pematang S ian tar, 
u n til  then c a p ita l o f  the Sumatran adm in istra tion . This fo rced  Gover­
nor Hasan and h is  c h ie f  o f f i c i a l s  to  evacuate to  B u k ittin gg i where they 
e s ta b lish ed  the Sumatran c a p ita l on August 6. With V ice -P res id en t 
H atta 's  presence there from ju s t  a fte r  the Dutch a tta ck , B u k ittin gg i 
came to be termed, at le a s t  among the Minangkabau, "the second c a p ita l"  
o f  In d on esia . 121
An agreement had apparently been reached between Sukarno and Hatta 
in  the spring  o f  1947 whereby there was a sep aration  o f  command, with
unclear whether this had any connection with their imminent attack. See Hamka, 
Kenang-kenangan, pp. 347-49; Sumatera Tengah Special Number August 10, 1954, 
pp. 34-35, 37; PST, pp. 155-56.
118. Ibid., pp. 575-76; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 246-47; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p.
351. Hamka, who emphasizes the gains of the Dutch in the face of the disunity 
and retreat of the Indonesian forces, appears to agree with the extent o f the 
advance, but observes that to the east the Dutch were not far from Solok, and 
to the south not far from Tarusan. Siguntur Tua is not marked on Map 3, but
it  is north of Kota Sungeipinang, against which the Dutch launched an unsuccess­
ful attack. For a comparison with their advances elsewhere in Sumatra and 
Java, see Map 2.
119. However, I have seen no indication that the Dutch U Brigade was smaller than Y 
or Z. It is also clear that they were hoping to occupy Bukittinggi and Solok. 
Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 351.
120. Because o f the vulnerability and breadth o f this northern front, TNI forces 
there were augmented by three battalions o f the Legium Sjahid in early 1948 
(see below, p. 102). Its headquarters was at Padang Pandjang. The region 
around Pariaman came under command o f the navy. PST, pp. 575-76.
121. From the Isana in Bukittinggi Hatta directed both the military and politica l 
affairs of Sumatra, through constant meetings with the governor and panglima 
of Sumatra. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 373.
102
Sukarno to  lead  the stru g g le  on Java and Hatta that on Sumatra.122 From 
June 10 when he a rrived  in Medan Hatta had been exh ortin g  Sumatran 
leaders on the need fo r  un ity  in  th e ir  common stru gg le  against the 
Dutch, and immediately a fte r  the Dutch a ttack  he encouraged form ation  
o f  a Front Pertahanan Nasional (n a tion a l Defense F ron t), in corp ora tin g  
the d iverse  m ilita ry  and c iv i l i a n  organ iza tion s  on the is la n d . This 
body was to  work c lo s e ly  with the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah e s ta b lish e d  
a year p re v io u s ly . Both c iv i l i a n  and m ilita ry  lead ers were present at 
a meeting in B u k ittin gg i on July 29 in which a t o ta l  o f  56 groups 
agreed to  jo in  togeth er in to  the fro n t  under the lead ersh ip  o f ’ Hamka, 
and with Chatib Suleiman as s e c r e t a r y .123 124 This fro n t  was to se t  up a 
lo c a l  defense org a n iza tion  with BPNK (Barisan Pengawal N egeri dan Kota) 
which was to m ob ilize  a l l  young men between the ages o f  seventeen and 
t h ir t y - f iy e  .12lf
At the same time moves were underway to  implement the P re s id e n t 's  
May 5 order that a l l  la s jk a r  groups should be in corporated  in to  the 
TNI.125 The f i r s t  step  toward that o b je c t iv e  was the cre a t io n  on July 1 
o f  a Dewan Kelasjkaran Sumatera Tengah under C ol. S ja r i f  Usman.126 In 
August the la s jk a r  groups were co n so lid a ted  in to  a Legiun S jah id , again 
under S ja r i f  Usman.127 The fo llo w in g  month Hatta named the H izbullah  
commander, A. R. S t. Mansur, as t i t u la r  major general in charge o f  
steps to in corp ora te  th is  fo r c e  in to  the TNI, and in  November i t s  name 
was changed to  TNI Resimen Istimewa Komandemen Sumatera, th is  regiment 
being fused in to  D iv is ion  IX Banteng on February 2 o f  1948 .128 These 
moves, however, ra ised  resentment among the la s jk a r  fo r c e s ,  many o f  
whom sent demands and requests fo r  a degree o f  autonomy to the Sumatran 
panglima. A fte r  d iscu ss ion s  w ith D iv is ion  IX, they were allow ed to  
form three b a t ta l io n s , but not th e ir  own regiment w ith in  the d iv is io n . 
P a r t icu la r ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the la s jk a r  groups to  accept was the rep lace
122. Ibid. , p. 353; PST, p. 157; Kami Perkenalkan, p. 43; Wolf states that "At the 
mountain stronghold of Bukit Tinggi in the Menangkabau area of West Sumatra 
Vice-President Hatta was commissioned by the Indonesian Cabinet and the KNIP
to set up a new capital in the event o f an attack on Djokja. Hatta himself was 
delegated to assume formal leadership o f both the c iv il government and the 
armed forces in case President Soekamo and Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin should 
be unable to leave Djokja." Indonesia Story, pp. 139-40.
123. The 56 component groups included the Masjumi, Partai Sosialis, PNI, PKI, Pesin- 
do, Perti, Muhammadijah, PSII, MTKAAM, Barisan Hizbullah and Barisan Sabilillah 
Other leaders were Karim Halim, Rasuna Said, and Udin. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, 
pp. 359-60.
124. PST, p. 158. 125. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 83.
126. Former commander o f Regiment I o f the Banteng division. Its deputy head was
Agus Salim Murai (commander o f Hizbullah), its  secretary Anwar Mulin (commander 
o f Sabilillah), and its members Sofjan Siradj (commander o f Lasjmi), Gazali 
Ismy (commander of Barisan Hulubalang), and Rasroel (commander o f Kesatria 
Pesindo). PST, p. 154.
127. This included the Hizbullah, Lasjmi, Barisan GPU, Sabilillah, Barisan Merah, 
Sjaifullah, Tentera Allah, Barisan Hulubalang, Barisan Istimewa and others. 
Ibid., p. 577.
128. On the formation of the Resimen Istimewa see ib id . , pp. 161, 577-78; Mansoer, 
Sedjarah, pp. 250-51; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 376-77.
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ment o f  most o f  th e ir  o f f i c e r s  by TNI commanders from the Banteng d i v i ­
s io n . 129
A fter  th is  in corp ora tion  the Banteng d iv is io n  con s is ted  o f  s ix  
regim ents, fo r  in  August Hasan B a s r i! s Regiment IV in Riau had been r e ­
organized  in to  two regim ents. Basri continued to  command Regiment IV 
and Regiment V was under Major Toha H anafi. The new Regiment VI was 
commanded by Major Kemal M ustafa, and i t  a ss is te d  Regiment I on the 
northern f r o n t .130
Whatever chance e x is te d  o f  an actu a l in te g ra tio n  o f  the m ilita ry  
and p o l i t i c a l  fo r ce s  on Sumatra disappeared in  ea rly  1948. By that 
time the TNIfs heavy-handed approach had already a lien a ted  many o f  the 
la s jk a r  groups. But i t  was the R en v ille  Agreement and the departure o f  
Hatta to Java, 131 which led  to the fragm entation o f  the FPN. The Ren­
v i l l e  Agreement again brought to the su rface  the d issen s ion  between 
many o f  the FPN's component groups with regard to  the path being pur­
sued by the cen tra l government, and during the f i r s t  months o f  1948 the 
orga n iza tion  was no longer pretending to  the fu n ction  o f  u n ify in g  the 
stru gg le  in West Sumatra. The in d iv id u a l p a r tie s  increased  in  stren g th , 
drawing away many o f  the leaders from a body which no longer rep re ­
sented th e ir  v ie w s .132 13 The only r o le  which the FPN reta in ed  was i t s  
assignment to  conduct the p r e b is c it e  in  the D utch-occupied reg ion s 
around Padang, as s t ip u la te d  in the R en v ille  Agreement. The d is a f ­
fe c te d  members o f  the la s jk a r  groups withdrew from the TNI, return ing 
to  th e ir  homes, w ith many o f  them jo in in g  the lo c a l  s e cu r ity  fo r ce s  o f  
the BPNK or reform ing th e ir  o ld  u n i t s .139
129. PST, pp. 477-78. Another reason for dissatisfaction could well have been the 
distribution of arms which was on the ratio o f 1:4 to the number o f soldiers. 
Apparently the Mizbullah in particular had previously been well equipped with 
arms because they had been able to capture many during the time o f the British 
occupation. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 377.
130. Regiments I, II and III were s t i l l  under A. Halim, Thalib and A. Husein. See 
above footnote 97. The TNI commands on Sumatra at the time were Division VIII, 
South Sumatra; Division IX, Central Sumatra; and Division X, Atjeh and East 
Sumatra, with several autonomous brigades. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 158.
131. After leaving the ’’Renville" on January 9, 1948, Sjarifuddin went firs t  to 
Singapore to consult with Sjahrir, and then proceeded to Bukittinggi. He and 
Hatta traveled on to Java for discussions with the government concerning the 
Dutch demands that appeared to them to be an ultimatum. After the fa ll o f the 
Sjarifuddin cabinet on January 23 as a result of the Renville Agreement, Hatta 
was appointed to lead the new government. Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 
88-90; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 231-32; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 378.
132. Ibid. , pp. 386-88. According to him the communists and some socialists joined 
Sjarifuddin’ s Front Demokrasi Ra’ ayat. The Masjumi strengthened its organiza­
tion. The opposition to Sjarifuddin in the socialist group followed Sjahrir 
into his Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Amongst the leaders of the FPN who joined 
this latter party were Chatib Suleiman, Juir Muhammad and several Pesindo 
pemuda. Both Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir accompanied Hatta on a trip to Bukit­
tinggi on February 5. PST, p. 164.
133. Ibid., p. 579. According to Nasution, there were reports from the Sumatra com­
mand of former lasjkar groups in West Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Atjeh attacking 
and disarming TNI units in these regions. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 235.
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R a tio n a liza tio n  and D ecen tra liza tion
The R en v ille  Agreement, apart from the d is s a t is fa c t io n  i t  caused 
the cen tra l repu blican  lea d ersh ip , d id  not have as great an impact on 
Sumatra as i t  d id  on Java. Dutch au th ority  remained lim ited  to  an area 
o f  on ly  about o n e - f i f t h  o f  the is la n d , c o n tr o l being most ex ten sive  on 
the east and southeastern  c o a s ts , with only a pocket around Padang.134 
Thus, at le a s t  in  West Sumatra, there was no need fo r  any su b sta n tia l 
withdrawal o f  Indonesian troops from the D utch-occupied  t e r r i t o r y .135
On taking over co n tro l o f  the cen tra l government, Hatta inaugurat­
ed a b a s ic  reorg a n iza tion  o f  both m ilita ry  and c iv i l i a n  a f fa ir s  aimed 
at ach iev in g  g rea ter coherence o f  the rep u b lican  fo r ce s  in the more 
lim ited  areas they now c o n tr o l le d . He attempted to  carry  out p o l i c ie s  
o f  r a t io n a liz a t io n  and re co n stru ctio n  o f  the armed fo r c e s ,  and decen­
t r a l iz a t io n  o f  the c iv i l i a n  adm in istra tive  o rg a n iza tion .
In the m ilita ry  f i e l d ,  the aim o f  r a t io n a liz a t io n  was to stream ­
lin e  the army stru ctu re  by massive d em ob iliza tion , and to create  
'"m o b ile  o f fe n s iv e  system s' o f  s h i f t in g  p ock ets" o f  h igh ly  tra in e d , 
more fu l ly  armed regu lar fo r c e s ,  supported by t e r r i t o r ia l  m i l i t i a s .136 
In Sumatra Nasution envisaged fou r s u b te r r ito r ie s  (correspon din g to  the 
fou r p ro je c te d  autonomous ad m in istra tive  r e g io n s ) , South Sumatra, Cen­
t r a l  Sumatra, Tapanuli-East Sumatra, and A tjeh . Each o f  these s u b te r r i­
t o r ie s  would have an in fa n try  brigade made up o f  severa l m obile b a t t a l ­
io n s , and t e r r i t o r ia l  u n its  d is tr ib u te d  amongst the kabupaten. 137
To convey these in s tr u c t io n s , Nasution accompanied Hatta to  West 
Sumatra in A p ril 1948. Their plans were c o ld ly  re ce iv ed  by the Suma­
tran panglima, w ith Major General Suhardjo s ta tin g  that the commanders 
who had been f ig h t in g  in  th e ir  own reg ion s would not be w il l in g  to  be 
moved nor th e ir  u n its  to be reorgan ized . The army in Sumatra, he 
s ta te d , was e s s e n t ia l ly  an army dependent on the lo c a l  p op u la tion , and 
in  those circum stances the government on Java was in  no p o s it io n  to  
impose i t s  w is h e s .138 * I t  was thus not u n t i l  November when C olonel 
H idajat was sent to  rep la ce  Major General Suhardjo as PTTS (Panglima 
Tentara dan T erritorium  Sumatera) that any e f f o r t  was made to  implement 
the r a t io n a liz a t io n  orders fo r  Sumatra.133 I t  was p o s s ib ly  because o f  
th is  delay that there appear to  have been no echoes o f  the Madiun r e ­
b e l l io n  in  West Sumatra.140 Immediately a fte r  the r e b e l l io n  Sumatran
134. Of the three Dutch brigades on Sumatra, Brigade Y controlled the residency o f 
Palembang, U Padang and its  surroundings, and Z East Sumatra, with an additional 
force at Tandjung Pinang for the islands o f Bangka, Belitung and Riau. Ibid ., 
p. 158.
135. This contrasted with the situation in East Sumatra, where the republican forces 
had to retreat into Tapanuli from the plantation area around Medan. Reid, 
Indonesian National Revolution, p. 134.
136. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 263.
137. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 158. 138. Ibid., p. 159.
139. After taking over command, Col. Hidajat sent Lt. Col. Askari to Atjeh, Maj.
Akil to Riau, Lt. Col. Kawilarang to Tapanuli, and Maj. S. Tjakradipura to 
West Sumatra. Ibid. , pp. 159, 256.
140. There was clearly suspicion that the armed clashes between TNI and lasjkar
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branches o f  the PKI met w ith the governor to  s ta te  th e ir  firm  support 
o f  the republican  governm ent.141
Shortly  a fte r  Suhardjo was tra n s fe rred  to  army headquarters in 
J og ja , Ismael Lengah was a lso  removed from h is command to become an 
in s tr u c to r  at the Jog ja  M ilita ry  Academy,142 h is  p lace  as head o f  the 
Banteng d iv is io n  being taken by Lt. C ol. Dahlan Ibrahim, who had been 
serv in g  as d iv is io n  c h ie f  o f  s t a f f . 143 The Banteng d iv is io n  was then 
d iv ided  in to  s u b t e r r i t o r ie s ,  w ith the Banteng brigade sta tion ed  at 
B u k ittin gg i resp on sib le  fo r  the West Sumatra s u b te r r ito r y , and a u n it 
(undefined) under Hasan Basri fo r  the su b te rr ito ry  o f  R ia u /In d ra g ir i , 
w ith headquarters at Pakanbaru.144 145 D iv is ion  IX fo r ce s  were d iv ided  in to  
a t e r r i t o r ia l  s e c t io n  and m obile t r o o p s , w ith the tra in ed  s o ld ie r s  en­
ter in g  the la t t e r  group. C olonel H id a ja t 's  attempts at r a t io n a l iz a ­
t io n , however, were on ly  in th e ir  prelim inary  stages when they were 
overturned by the second Dutch m ilita ry  a ction  o f  December 19, 1948.
A lso during 1948 a b a s ic  reorg a n iza tion  o f  the adm in istra tive  
stru ctu re  o f  government on Sumatra was in s t itu te d . The p rov in ce  o f  
Sumatra was d isso lv e d  under Law No. 10 o f  A p ril 15, and i t  was rep laced  
by the p rov in ces o f  North Sumatra (in corp ora tin g  the re s id e n c ie s  o f  
A tjeh , East Sumatra and T a p a n u li), and South Sumatra (in corp ora tin g  
Bengkulen, Palembang, Lampung, and B an gka-B elitu ng),14^  The deputy
forces in Tapanuli were tied in with the Madiun rebellion. The clashes were 
between Tapanuli TNI units and regular and lasjkar forces withdrawn from East 
Sumatra. In a further v is it  to the area at the beginning o f December Hatta 
helped bring the clashes to an end, and Kawilarang took over command there, 
with Ibrahim Adjie as his deputy. The southern part o f East Sumatra and Tapa­
nuli became Subterritory VII. See "Pengalaman Gerilja di Sumatera (Tapanuli 
Utura)" in Madjalah Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, No. 22 (1965), pp. 14-19.
141. Suripno and Musso had stopped over for two days in Bukittinggi on their way to 
Java. Although the two held meetings in Bukittinggi, the identity o f Musso 
does not seem to have been revealed until after he arrived in Java. PST, p.
166.
142. In April 1948, at the request apparently o f Suhardjo, the Siliwangi had agreed 
to send Lt. Col. Kawilarang and Lt. Col. Daan Jahja (a Minangkabau) to Suma­
tra. The defense minister had planned that Kawilarang would become brigade 
commander o f Tapanuli/East Sumatra, and Daan Jahja head of the operations staff 
o f the Sumatra command. However, Ismael Lengah had already been appointed by 
Suhardjo to the latter position, his appointment being confirmed by the pang- 
lima besar. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 159. It was possibly because o f this that 
Ismael Lengah was removed to Java after Hidajat's assumption of command. His 
transfer took place on December 3. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri implies that it  was a 
matter o f personal dislike on Hattafs side. Sedjarah Revolusi, II, p. 191.
143. PST, p. 582; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 404.
144. The head o f the Banteng brigade, Dahlan Ibrahim, had A. Halim as his chief o f 
sta ff. Regiments IV and V o f the Riau command were reformed into three battal­
ions. There does not seem to have been similar reorganization o f the West 
Sumatra regiments. PST, p. 583.
145. Such a division had been advocated by Hatta as early as 1945, see above, n. 34. 
His view o f this appears to have been strengthened by his stay in Sumatra during 
1947, for in his report on the situation there after he returned to Jogja he
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governor o f  Central Sumatra, Mr. Nasrun, was appointed governor o f  the 
new p ro v in ce . 11+6 The Dewan Perwakilan Sumatera was rep laced  by a Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakjat in  each o f  the three p r o v in c e s .146 47
The R epublic o f  Indonesia Law No. 22 o f  August 1948 envisaged a 
grea ter degree o f  d e ce n tra liz a t io n  fo r  Indon esia , w ith con s id erab le  
autonomy being assumed by lo c a l  adm in istra tive  u n its . I t  la id  out 
three le v e ls  o f  lo c a l  government: the p rov in ce , the kabupaten and the
desa, which were Mto become ’ s e lf-g o v e rn in g  r e g io n s 1 (daerah swatantra) 
p ossessin g  wide powers o f  autonomy over th e ir  own a f f a i r s . " lh8
This law was welcomed in Central Sumatra, w ith the DPR on Septem­
ber 30 appointing a committee to  speed moves toward d e c e n tr a l iz a t io n .149 
The D ecen tra liza tion  Committee proposed that the three re s id e n c ie s  o f  
Central Sumatra be rep laced  by e leven  kabupaten made up o f  118 w ila jah  
(which corresponded to  the desa le v e l  envisaged in the cen tra l govern­
ment la w ) .150 * U ntil new e le c t io n s  could  be h e ld , the DPR fo r  the
stated: ffln the two years after the proclamation the Central Government seemed
to neglect Sumatra and many powers were given to the Governor, so that he be­
came the so-called small President (his position is considered higher than that 
of a minister). However in practice the Governor o f Sumatra is only the Gover­
nor o f Pematang Siantar, because of the lack o f communication with the Resi­
dents. The Residents continue to function like their predecessors in the Japa­
nese period. The position o f the Sub-Governor is not clear. The regencies 
have been established, but nobody knows what their duties are." English trans­
lation made available to the Committee of Good Offices of an "Outline of Vice 
President’ s Statement on the Situation in Sumatra" at a meeting in Jogjakarta, 
January 17, 1948.
146. Mr. Djamil had been appointed to head a Committee on Higher Education on April 
29, 1947, when Mr. Nasrun had replaced him as deputy governor o f Central Suma- 
tra. PST, p. 151.
147. Members from West Sumatra in this body were H. Iljas Jacoeb (Masjumi), Marzoeki 
Jatim (Masjumi), Sultani St. Malaka (Murba), A. Gaffar Djambek (no party), 
Saadoeddin Djambek (n .p .), Usman Keadilan (PKI), Anwar St. Saidi (n .p .), Dt. 
Simaradjo (MTKAAM), S. J. St. Mangkuto (Masjumi), Ahmad Sjuib (Murba), Abdullah 
(Murba), Bachtaroeddin (PKI), R. S. Suriapradja (PKI), Zainal Zainur (Pemuda), 
Dr. A. Rahim Usman (Partai Sosia lis), Damanhoeri Djamil (PSII), Tan Tuah Bagindo 
Ratu (PBI), H. Siradjudin Abbas (Perti), Chatib Suleiman (SPI), and H. Mahmud 
Janus (n .p .). Members o f the firs t  executive were Dt. Mangku (PKI) from Riau, 
Dr. Sjagaf Jahja (PBI) from Djambi, and A. Rahim Usman, S. J. St. Mangkuto, and 
Abdullah from West Sumatra. H. Iljas Jacoeb headed the body. Ibid. , p. 394.
148. John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 28. He examines the law on pp. 28-40.
149. PST, pp. 347-48.
150. There would be five kabupaten formed in West Sumatra, four in Riau, and two in
Djambi, with correspondingly 76, 28, and 14 wilajah. The former seven kabu­
paten o f West Sumatra would become: (1) Singgalang Pasaman (formerly Agam)
with its capital at Bukittinggi (16 wilajah); (2) Sinamar (formerly Limapuluh 
Kota), capital at Pajakumbuh (14 wilajah); (3) Talang (Tanah Datar), capital 
at Solok (19 wilajah); (4) Samudera (Padang Pariaman), capital at Pariaman (17 
wilajah); (5) Pesisir Selatan and Kerintji (Balai Selasa), capital at Sungai 
Penuh (10 wilajah). Details o f the proposals can be found in ib id . , pp. 346- 
60, 363-66.
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w ila jah  o f  West Sumatra would co n s is t  o f  the members o f  the DPN se t  up 
two years p r e v io u s ly .151 This proposa l was accepted  by the government 
o f  Central Sumatra, and on November 30 i t  ordered that the reorga n iza ­
t io n  be ca rr ie d  out by the end o f  Decem ber.152 The second Dutch m i l i ­
tary  a ct ion  o f  December 21, however, brought those plans to a h a lt ,  and 
com pelled the governor to rev iv e  the re s id e n c ie s  o f  Djambi, Riau and 
West Sumatra.
Impact o f  the Second Dutch A ction
The ch aracter and scope o f  the second Dutch "p o l ic e  a c t io n "  in 
Sumatra, which was launched at dawn on*December 19, 1948, fa r  exceeded 
that o f  t;he o f fe n s iv e  eighteen  months p re v io u s ly . Again Dutch troops 
moved out from Padang to  the n orth , east and south , but th is  time they 
apparently commanded much grea ter fo r ce s  and firep ow er , mounting amphib 
ious landings and la r g e -s c a le  bombing and a r t i l l e r y  a tta ck s . To the 
north th e ir  fo r ce s  d iv id ed  at Lubuk Alung, w ith one group moving up the 
coast to  Pariaman, and the other p ressin g  on to Padang Pandjang, and 
from there to B u k itt in g g i. From B u k ittin gg i they launched o ffe n s iv e s  
against the rep u b lican  fo r ce s  which f in a l ly  se t  up th e ir  northern fro n t  
subcommand at Matur. To the e a s t , the Dutch coord in ated  in fa n try  
attacks with an amphibious landing on Lake Singkarak from where they 
advanced to occupy Solok on December 20. To the south they moved more 
s low ly , launching th e ir  main assau lt on January 6 a fte r  landing troops 
at Painan. Throughout the spring they extended th e ir  c o n t r o l ,  making 
fu rth er  landings down the coa st and advancing in to  the in t e r io r .  153
By ea rly  1949 they had occu p ied  most o f  the towns and major v i l ­
lages o f  West Sumatra, and from these ou tposts d ispatched  u n its  to 
p a tro l the surrounding cou n tryside  and a ttack  suspect v i l la g e s .  During 
the Dutch advance the repu blican  fo r c e s  appear to  have put up l i t t l e  
r e s is ta n ce , in general evacuating the towns as the Dutch approached, 
and re tr e a t in g , sometimes in  d is o rd e r , to  more d e fe n s ib le  p o s it io n s  
c h ie f ly  in the f o o t h i l l s  and on the mountain s lo p e s .
The shock o f  the Dutch a tta ck , p a r t ic u la r ly  the bombing o f  B ukit­
t in g g i and other towns, seems to  have thrown the Indonesians in to  com­
p le te  d iso rd e r . A group from the ce n tra l government, in clu d in g  the 
Republican M in ister o f  Economic A f fa ir s ,  S ja fr id d in  Prawiranegara, was 
gathered in  B u k ittin gg i from December 18 togeth er with lo c a l  m ilita ry  
and c iv i l i a n  le a d e rs , aw aiting the a r r iv a l o f  Sukarno's plane which was 
scheduled to  stop  over there on i t s  way to  In d ia . 15** Panic seems to 
have been widespread as news a rrived  o f  the f a l l  o f  Jog jakarta  and u l t i  
mately o f  the a rrests  o f  Sukarno and Hatta and others o f  the republican  
le a d e r s h ip .155 In a s e r ie s  o f  hu rried  meetings S ja fru dd in  arranged to
151. See above, p. 94. 152. PST, p. 359.
153. Ibid. , pp. 169-70, 585-91; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 254-57.
154. PST, p. 169; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 403. Hamka writes that when they heard 
the sound o f a plane they thought it  was carrying Sukarno, only to discover 
that it  was the beginning of the Dutch attack.
155. Ibid. , pp. 403-404. The Propinsi states that before withdrawing from Bukit­
tinggi, the Banteng division issued a bulletin that the presidential party had 
arrived safely in India, "which even though it  was not true, had a great influ­
ence in dispelling the panic caused by the Dutch broadcasts concerning the 
arrests o f Sukamo-Hatta." PST, p. 169.
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se t up and lead  a Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (PDRI)156 which 
was proclaim ed on December 22 a fte r  o f f i c i a l  news was rece ived  o f  the 
a rrests  on Java. By th is  time members o f  the Emergency Government had 
evacuated to  a Mp lace  in  Sum atra ."157 S h ortly  b e fore  the a r r iv a l o f  the 
Dutch fo rce s  the West Sumatran lead ersh ip  had a lso  r e t ir e d  to  e s ta b lish  
them selves in K o to t in g g i. 158
The d isord er in  the armed fo r ce s  was d ou b tle ss ly  la rg e ly  the r e ­
su lt  o f  the s ca le  o f  the Dutch o p e ra tio n s , and the widespread use o f  
tanks, bombing, s tr a f in g  and a r t i l l e r y  in th e ir  advance. In a d d it io n , 
however, i t  was apparently the s tra tegy  o f  the new Sumatran commander, 
C olonel H id a ja t, not to  engage the Dutch d ir e c t ly  but to  withdraw and 
prepare fo r  g u e r r i l la  w arfare. As th is  re tre a t  fo llow ed  so c lo s e ly  on 
C olonel H id a ja t1s assumption o f  command, and the tra n s fe r  o f  Suhardjo 
and Lengah, i t  can have done l i t t l e  to  enhance the p o s it io n  o f  the new 
commander.159 There was apparently con s id erab le  d is s a t is fa c t io n  with 
the p o l i c y ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  among the younger members o f  the former in d e­
pendent u n it s .160 The fa c t  that Hamka rep orts  Dahlan Djambek, one o f  
the h igh est-ran k in g  o f  the ea rly  lo c a l  commanders, as being the la s t  
person to  leave B u k itt in g g i, suggests that there may have been d isa g re e ­
ment even among the upper echelons o f  the Banteng command with regard 
to the p o l ic y  being pursued by H id a ja t .161
156. Sjafruddin had accompanied Hatta to Sumatra earlier in the year to organize a 
resolutionary leadership there that could function in case the Dutch attacked 
Jogja. (Interview, February 21, 1971.) Apart from this general mandate from 
Hatta, he apparently did not recieve specific instructions from Java at the 
time of the Dutch attack. (See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 392; Reid, Indonesian 
National Revolution, p. 154.) Members o f the Emergency Government were Sja­
fruddin, Mr. A. A. Maramis, Mr. Teuku Moh. Hasan, Mr. Lukman Hakim, Mr. S. Md 
Rasjid, Ir. Sitompul, and Ir. Inderatjaja. PST, pp. 170-71.
157. Ibid. The seat of the PDRI moved principally between Muara Labuh and Sungai 
Dareh. Ibid. , p. 589.
158. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 414; PST, p. 171.
159. Reid writes: "Another competent young Dutch-trained o fficer from Java, Colonel
Hidajat, had earlier taken overall command of Sumatra from the ageing and in­
effective General Suhardjo." Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 151.
But it  seems unlikely that the local commanders in West Sumatra viewed the 
changeover in this light. The Sumatran command headquarters divided into sec­
tions with several o f them in pockets between Padang Sidempuan and Bukittinggi. 
Hidajat, however, le ft West Sumatra almost immediately for Atjeh and appears to 
have spent most of his time at Kota Radja. Nasution, TNI, III (Djakarta: Seru- 
ling Masa, 1971), pp. 41-42.
160. Hamka reports a confrontation between members o f the Hizbullah and Maj. Kemal 
Mustafa (deputy commander of Subcommand A [see n. 162 below]) at a small v i l ­
lage outside of Padang Pandjang, where they accused him of cowardice and ne­
glect of duty, and urged immediate attacks on the Dutch positions in Padang 
Pandjang. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 409-412. Hamka also recalls that imme­
diately before the Dutch attacked Padang Pandjang they gathered there with 
several others to listen to Tan Malaka's speech from Kediri. Ibid. , p. 405.
161. According to Hamka, Djambek destroyed the radio station before he le ft , and 
later personally led attacks on Dutch forces in Bukittinggi from his positions 
just outside the city . Ibid. , pp. 420, 428-29.
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A fte r  the i n i t i a l  trauma o f  the re tre a t  when communications were 
broken between most o f  the armed u n its , the command stru ctu re  was 
slow ly  b u i l t  up, but i t  was now e s s e n t ia l ly  both f l e x ib le  and m obile . 
Dahlan Djambek soon rep laced  L t . C ol. M. Dahlan Ibrahim as head o f  the 
Banteng command, and he was a lso  p r in c ip a lly  resp on sib le  fo r  m ilita ry  
op eration s in  the regions o f  Agam and Lima Puluh Kota, with Major 
Thalib as h is  c h ie f  o f  s t a f f .  Under the cen tra l command there were 
three subcommands, corresponding to  the e a r l ie r  n orth , east and south 
fr o n ts , but w ith th e ir  headquarters u su a lly  fa r  in to  the m ou n ta in s.162
The lead ersh ip  o f  West Sumatra susta ined  severe blows during the 
ea rly  part o f  1949. A few days a fte r  they had se t up th e ir  headquar­
ters  in  K oto tin g g i, the Dutch overran the v i l la g e  on January 10, in ­
f l i c t in g ,  con s id erab le  damage though not fin d in g  the tran sm itter by 
which R as jid  maintained con ta ct w ith the S ja fru dd in  governm ent.163 More 
d isa strou s  was the in c id en t at S itudjuh  Batur, where a meeting had been 
arranged fo r  January 14 between many o f  the top West Sumatra lead ers  to 
attempt to  work out a s tra tegy  fo r  con fron tin g  the d r a s t ic a l ly  changed 
s itu a t io n  in  the reg ion . Many o f  the p a r tic ip a n ts  had tra v e led  long 
d istan ces on fo o t  to  reach the sm all v i l la g e  at the fo o t  o f  Mt. Sigung, 
about twelve k ilom eters from the Dutch outpost at the town o f  Pajakum- 
buh. The Dutch, however, had obtained  in t e l l ig e n c e  o f  the m eeting, and 
they attacked the v i l la g e  b e fo re  dawn on the 15th, k i l l in g  49 o f  the 
p a r t ic ip a n ts , in clu d in g  Chatib Su leim an.164
jfc jfe jfe
Immediately fo llo w in g  the launching o f  the Dutch attack  on Decem­
ber 19, the Sumatran leaders then meeting in B u k ittin gg i had decided  to  
d is so lv e  the prov in ce o f  Central Sumatra and i t s  government. Power was 
to be tra n sferred  to the residen cy  l e v e l ,  where the Dewan Pertahanan 
Daerah (DPD) was given f u l l  au th ority  to lead the m ilita ry  and c i v i l  
ad m in istra tion . The current Central Sumatra governor, Nasrun, was to
162. Subcommand A (formerly Regiments I and VI) which covered the northern front and 
which had retreated to Matur, was commanded by Lt. Col. A. Halim, supported by 
Maj. Kemal Mustafa. On the eastern front after the Dutch occupied Solok, Sub­
command B (former Regiment III) divided, with one section under Dep. Cmdr.
Anwar Badu at Sidjundjung, and Cmdr. A. Husein at Alahan Pandjang. When the 
Dutch overran both these towns, the headquarters was transferred to Muara 
Labuh, until it  too was occupied by the Dutch in April, after which it  was 
mobile. Fighting in this region continued until August 1949. Subcommand C
Con the southern front, formerly Regiment II) was now under the command of Maj. 
Alwi St. Maradjo. Its former commander Maj. Thalib had been put in charge of 
personnel and organization in the Banteng central command during the 1948 
rationalization, and in 1949 was Djambek's chief o f sta ff. This subcommand 
established its  headquarters at Sungei Penuh on December 24; after the Dutch 
attacked there on April 22, its  headquarters moved several times until the 
fighting ceased in September. PST, pp. 582-90.
163. Ibid. , p. 191; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 416, 420.
164. Among the others killed were Bupati Arisun St. Alamsjah of Lima Puluh Kota, 
Capt. Zainuddin and Maj. Munir Latif. Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim and Lt. Col. 
Thalib managed to escape, though Thalib was wounded. The fu llest account of 
the incident appears in Sumatera Tengah No. 123/4, January 25, 1954, pp. 37-40. 
Other accounts are in PST, pp. 196-97; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 421, 426; 
Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 262-64.
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coord in a te  these DPD o f  West Sumatra, Riau and D jam bi.165 The res id en t 
was to  head the DPD with h is  deputy to  be appointed by the m ilita ry  
commander o f  the reg ion . Thus in  West Sumatra, S. Mohd. R asjid  headed 
the DPD, w ith Dahlan Ibrahim as h is  i n i t i a l  d ep u ty .166 On January 2, 
1949, each residen cy  became a m ilita ry  re g io n , w ith the res id en t now 
appointed i t s  m ilita ry  govern or.167 I t  was s tre sse d  that th is  move was 
an emergency measure, and most o f  the bupati and lower o f f i c i a l s  r e ­
ta ined  th e ir  p o s it io n s , though they were now cla ssed  as "m ilita ry  
b u p a t i . " 168
At the beginning o f  May there was a fu rth er  reorg a n iza tion  whereby 
West Sumatra and Riau were again jo in e d  in to  the p rov in ce o f  C entral 
Sumatra, w ith R asjid  as i t s  m ilita ry  g ov ern or ,169 * w hile the residen cy  
o f  Djambi came under the au th ority  o f  the South Sumatra m ilita ry  gover­
n o r .170 This arrangement continued u n t i l  the beginning o f  the fo llo w in g  
y ea r , when a fte r  the tra n s fe r  o f  sovere ign ty  the p rov in ce o f  Central 
Sumatra (now a lso  to include Djambi and the Riau a rch ip e lago) was re a c ­
t iv a te d  under a c iv i l i a n  governm ent.171 When S. Mohd. R asjid  was tra n s­
fe rre d  to  the Local J o in t  Committee in  O ctober o f  1949, h is p lace  as 
m ilita ry  governor was taken by Mr. Nasrun, who reta in ed  the p o s it io n  o f  
governor a fte r  the tra n s fe r  o f  s o v e r e ig n ty .172
ifc *  jfe
In the ea rly  part o f  1949, having occu p ied  a l l  the major towns o f  
West Sumatra, the Dutch made moves towards crea tin g  a "Negara Minangka- 
bauM which they hoped would become one o f  the fed era ted  s ta tes  ou tsid e  
o f  the re p u b lic . As e a r ly  as December, ju s t  a fte r  they launched th e ir  
a tta ck , they had sent con ta cts  to S ja f e i ,  then in  h id in g  in  Padang 
Lawas, in v it in g  him to  lead the p r o je c te d  s t a t e .173 He re fu sed .
Any e a r l ie r  attempts to detach elements in West Sumatra from the 
re p u b lic  had been lim ited  by the fa c t  that Dutch co n tro l extended only 
to the immediate area around Padang. N evertheless in 1946 they had 
crea ted  in  the town a p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iza tio n , the Persatuan Umum, with
165. PST, p. 170.
166. Ibid. , p. 172. In the West Sumatra DPD the members from the executive were Dr. 
Ali Akbar and Orangkajo Ganto Suaro, and from the peoples* organizations, Ab­
dullah, Bachtaruddin, and Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas.
167. Ibid., pp. 180-81.
168. Ibid. , pp. 181, 196, 204-5. In a few cases, military officers were appointed 
district heads, particularly on the eastern front, where they led the local 
administrations for Muara Labuh, Solok, Sawah Lunto and Sulit Air. (Ibid. , p. 
589.) See also Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 154-55, where he con­
trasts the form of military government on Sumatra with that on Java.
169. This was apparently because o f uncertain lines of authority, caused by the head
of the DPD also being the military governor. Under the new system, the DPD of
West Sumatra was headed by Eni Karim and that o f Riau by R. M. Utojo (the
former military governor). PST, p. 211.
170. Ibid., p. 181. 171. Ibid., p. 229.
172. Ibid., p. 223. 173. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 413
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a m ilita ry  arm, the Serikat K utjing H itam .174 In 1947 the Persatuan 
Umum formed i t s e l f  in to  a Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat (DISBA) in 
Padang,175 *and a fte r  the second Dutch m ilita ry  a ction  branches o f  th is  
orga n iza tion  were se t up in other towns, such as Padang Pandjang and 
B u k itt in g g i, under the name B alai Permusjawaratan Sementara (B PS).175
From these organ iza tion s  grew a movement, weak and s h o r t - l iv e d , to 
crea te  a Negara Minangkabau (Minangkabau S tate) as part o f  the impend­
ing Federal R epublic o f  Indonesia . The f i r s t  step  was the e s t a b lis h ­
ment on March 20, 1949, o f  a "com mittee to  determ ine the statu s o f  the 
Minangkabau" which advocated sep aration  from the rep u b lic  so that West 
Sumatra would become one o f  the fed era ted  s t a t e s .177 B r ie f ly  i t  a t t r a c t ­
ed to  i t s  s id e  the form er re s id e n t , Dt. Perpatih  Baringek, who togeth er 
with Mr.<Harun A. R a s jid , broadcast the view that con tin u ation  o f  the 
s tru gg le  would on ly  fu rth er  hurt the people o f  West Sumatra, and that 
in  order to  ach ieve independence i t  was necessary  to  cooperate with the 
D utch.178 Baringek a lso  organized  a meeting in  la te  A p r il to  "reach  
com plete un ity  to  face  the current s itu a t io n  in  the Minangkabau," at 
which speakers from DISBA were prom inent. At th is  meeting he d iscla im ed  
any am bition to  head a "Negara M inangkabau."179
The rep u b lican  leaders in  West Sumatra combatted the movement by 
sending le t t e r s  to  Bangka and D jakarta , s ta tin g  that the v o ice s  o f  the 
DISBA did  not represent the Minangkabau p eop le , and demanding that 
e le c t io n s  be held  in those parts o f  West Sumatra under Dutch c o n t r o l .180 
By June Perpatih  Baringek had d istan ced  h im self from the DISBA, not 
appearing at a meeting i t  held  in  Padang, and sending a le t t e r  s ta tin g  
that the movement was sowing d is c o r d .181 Most o f  i t s  other leaders had 
accommodated with the re p u b lic  by the summer, and the BPS branch in 
B u k ittin gg i passed a re s o lu t io n  on August 29 recog n iz in g  that West 
Sumatra was part o f  the r e p u b l ic .182
174. PST, pp. 229-30. The Persatuan Umum was headed by Sidi Nan Putih and Arif 
Lubis. It published a newspaper called Suara Umum. The Serikat Kutjing Hitam 
was headed by Sidi Sjamsuddin. According to Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 266, members 
o f the Chinese community o f Padang who had formed the "Poh An-tui" defense 
force in 1946 joined the Persatuan Umum.
175. Waspada, May 9, 1949. 176. PST, pp. 230-31.
177. Waspada, May 24, 1949. This committee consisted o f: Dr. Rusma (who resigned
on March 23); Amadin glr. Dt. Berbangso; Daud glr. Dt. Bagindo Sati; Zakir glr. 
St. Maharadjo Lelo; Dr. Iljas Amirudin; Sjahfiri glr. Sutan Pangerang; Adnan, 
and Bermawi Glr. St. Radja Mas.
178. PST, p. 231. This account and also Merdeka, March 25, 1949, cite these two 
men as the promoters o f the movement.
179. Waspada, May 9, 1949.
180. Waspada, May 24, 1949. They stated their opinion that, while awaiting results 
o f the discussions between the Dutch and the republic, West Sumatra should be­
come a daerah otonomi within the republie.
181. Waspada, June 2, 1949. The journalist contrasted this meeting (with fifteen 
people present) with a concurrent meeting of the Muhammadijah attended by 2,000.
182. PST, p. 232.
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From then u n t il  the tra n s fe r  o f  sovere ign ty  at the end o f  1949 
only the area immediately surrounding the town o f  Padang s t i l l  remained 
as a daerah istimewa.l8i In December the res id en t o f  Padang surrendered 
h is au th ority  to  the governor o f  Central Sumatra. This de fa c to  con ­
t r o l  was confirm ed in  March 1950 when Padang was o f f i c i a l l y  in co rp o ­
rated  w ith in  the residen cy  o f  West Sumatra.181*
A fte r  the Trans-fer o f  Sovereignty
The re c o n s t itu t io n  o f  a c iv ilia n -a d m in is te re d  prov ince o f  Central 
Sumatra, now in clu d in g  the Riau arch ipelago  and Djambi, was com pleted 
by the middle o f  1950 .183 485 I t  was to be headed by a governor who would 
share au th ority  w ith a Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Sumatera Tengah, con­
s is t in g  o f  twenty members from West Sumatra, f iv e  from Riau and fou r 
from D jam bi.186 Almost immediately i t  became c le a r  that there was a 
fundamental c o n f l i c t  between the view o f  th is  lo c a l  adm in istra tion , 
p a r t ic u la r ly  i t s  West Sumatra component, and that o f  the cen tra l gov­
ernment over the amount o f  power to  be delegated  to  the reg ion s making 
up independent Indonesia . The cen tra l rep u b lican  government, p a r t ic u ­
la r ly  a fte r  form ation  o f  the un itary  s ta te  in  August 1950, appeared no 
lon ger w il l in g  to a llow  any rea l measure o f  lo c a l  autonomy such as had 
been granted most e x p l i c i t l y  in  Law No. 22 o f  1948. In co n tra s t , d e ­
c e n tr a liz a t io n  o f  au th ority  had been an assumption b a s ic  to  the con­
tinuum o f  p o l i t i c a l  developments in West Sumatra during the re v o lu t io n , 
where there had grown up a c le a r  exp ecta tion  that the reg ion  would be 
la rg e ly  autonomous in  conducting i t s  in tern a l a f fa ir s  under an o v e ra ll  
cen tra l ad m in istra tion .
These contrary  views found exp ression  in  a fundamental c o n f l i c t  
between the DPRST (with i t s  execu tive  body, the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah 
[DPD]) and the cen tra l government which was conducted throughout 1950. 
The d ispute focu sed  on the issue o f  the degree o f  power possessed  by 
the reg ion a l au th ority  with regard to  appointment o f  the governor 
(kepala daerah). In A p r i l ,  the DPR demanded the removal o f  Governor 
Nasrun, and subm itted names o f  i t s  own nominees fo r  h is  rep lacem en t.187
183. There were also daerah istimewa in Riau (particularly the islands) and Djambi. 
Ibid. , pp. 302-3.
184. Ibid., p. 304.
185. The Riau archipelago which had been under Dutch authority during much o f the 
revolution was incorporated into the province o f Central Sumatra at the begin­
ning of May 1950. PST, pp. 305-6. There were several meetings concerning the 
status of Djambi during the firs t  half o f 1950, for since the second Dutch mil­
itary action, it  had been o ffic ia lly  tied to South Sumatra. It was finally, 
reincorporated into the province of Central Sumatra in the middle of the year. 
Ibid. , pp. 306-8.
186. Most o f the membership o f this body was the same as in 1948 (see above, p. 108, 
n. 167). The two charges were that Thaher Samad had taken Chatib Suleiman's 
place, and H. Rusli A. Wahid replaced H. Siradjudin Abbas who had become a 
member o f parliament. Abdullah was also in Java. H. Iljas Jacoeb headed the 
executive (DPD), with Gulmat Siregar as his deputy. (R. S. Suria Pradja and 
Marzoeki Jatim were acting members.) PST, p. 395.
187. It is unclear why the DPR wanted Nasrun's removal, the only reason given being 
that he had lost the confidence o f the people of West Sumatra. The demand was
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While h is  p o s it io n  was being debated Nasrun took a month's leave from 
o f f i c e ,  with the DPD a ssertin g  i t s  r ig h t  to  assume h is  duties in the 
in te r im .* 188 A fter  con s id erab le  d e la y , the Hatta government f in a l ly  
agreed to  Nasrun's rem oval, r e c a l l in g  him to D jakarta on August 1, 
1 9 50 .189
With h is  departure, the c o n f l i c t  s h i f te d  to  the s e le c t io n  o f  h is  
rep lacem ent.190 A d e c is io n  on th is  was i n i t i a l l y  delayed by a change o f  
government in ,D ja k a rta , w ith N atsir rep la c in g  Hatta as prime m in ister 
o f  the new u n itary  government. The In te r io r  M in ister , Mr. A ssaat, him­
s e l f  a Minangkabau, v is i t e d  Central Sumatra on September 29 to  attempt 
to  reach an agreement, w hile Deputy Governor, S. J . Sutan Mangkuto, 
acted  as p ro v is io n a l head o f  the p rov in ce . Apparently unable to  come 
to a compromise w ith the reg ion a l a d m in istra tion , the I n te r io r  M in istry  
on November 9 appointed Ruslan M uljohardjo as a ctin g  governor, ignoring  
the names put forward by the DPR.191 The DPR refu sed  to  accept the gov­
ernm ent's appointee and resubm itted th e ir  own candidates fo r  con s id era ­
t io n . D jakarta, however, in s is te d  that Ruslan return  as governor to 
Central Sumatra at the end o f  December. The deadlock was f in a l ly  
broken only when in Law No. 1 o f  1951, which app lied  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  
th is  p ro v in ce , the N atsir government on January 5 suspended both the 
DPR and DPD o f  Central Sumatra.192 A uthority  in  the prov ince was tra n s­
fe rre d  from these bodies to  the governor and a six-man committee ap­
poin ted  by the I n te r io r  M in istry  on h is  recommendation. Although i t  
was declared  that th is  committee would be rep laced  w ith in  s ix  months 
by a new DPR formed in accordance with Law 22 o f  1948, th is  d id  not
part o f many resolutions aimed at greater autonomy for Central Sumatra passed 
at the third plenary session of the DPRST which was held April 3-12, 1950.
Ibid. , pp. 395-97.
188. Ibid. , pp. 312, 400-402. Contradictory orders regarding who held legitimate 
authority were issued during this period by the Interior Ministry.
189. Ibid., p. 407.
190. The in itia l choice for his replacement was H. Iljas Jacoeb, head o f the DPR.
He refused to be considered for the post, and during a v isit o f the Interior 
Minister Susanto to West Sumatra July 7-11, a lis t  o f four candidates for 
governor was submitted by the DPR. This was in accordance with Paragraph 1, 
Article 18 o f the Law of 1948 which stated: "The Regional Head of a province 
is appointed by the President from at least two, and at the most four, candi­
dates nominated by the Provincial Representative Council." Legge, Central 
Authority, p. 256. The names submitted were H. Iljas Jacoeb, Mr. St. M.
Rasjid, Dr. M. Djamil, and Dr. A. Rahim Usman. PST, pp. 403-4.
191. In their o ffic ia l explanation o f the selection, the Interior Ministry stated: 
"To consolidate and develop the administration, i t  is necessary to have a man 
who has sufficient general knowledge of government. After we weighed the four 
candidates from the DPRST we were compelled to go outside of those candidates, 
on the basis o f Paragraph 4, Section 26 of Law No. 22, and in addition Mr.
S. M. Rasjid was not willing to become Governor o f Central Sumatra." Ibid. , 
p. 417.
192. For a fu ll text o f this law, see ib id . , pp. 418-20. With the exception of Cen­
tral Sumatra, the provisional legislatures in the other provinces continued to 
function until July 1, 1956. G. S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia: 
Legislative Aspects (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 50.
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happen, and the governor and h is  committee continued as the fu n ction in g  
p ro v in c ia l au th ority  o f  Central Sum atra.193
There were severa l iro n ie s  in th is  s itu a t io n , p r in c ip a lly  that the 
p o l ic y  o f  imposing D jak arta 's  own ch o ice  o f  governor on Central Sumatra 
was form ulated and implemented by cab in ets headed by two prime m in is­
ters  o f  Minangkabau o r ig in , Hatta and N a ts ir . M oreover, Hatta had long 
been a strong proponent o f  autonomy fo r  the re g io n s , advocating con s id ­
erab le  d e ce n tra liz a t io n  o f  a u th or ity . I t  is  a lso  n otab le  that th is  
move was taken against one o f  the stron g est bases o f  rep u b lican  power 
throughout the s tru g g le  w ith the Dutch, ra ther than against a reg ion  
with a record  o f  c o lla b o r a t io n  with the c o lo n ia l  a u th ority .
I t  i s . d i f f i c u l t  to e s ta b lis h  the r ig h ts  and wrongs o f  the case . 
C learly  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  were a ctin g  in  an in tra n sigen t manner 
v i s - i - v i s  D jakarta. In a d d it io n , there are h in ts  that both the o p p o s i­
t io n  to  Nasrun and the re fu sa l to  accept M uljohardjo may w ell have been 
con fin ed  to  the Minangkabau elements o f  the Central Sumatran DPR, and 
there was c le a r ly  con s id erab le  ten sion  between them and those from 
other reg ion s represented  in the c o u n c il . I t  may w ell have been that 
D jakarta f e l t  that only by appointing a non-Minangkabau as the governor 
o f  Central Sumatra cou ld  they minimize the fea rs  o f  Djambi and Riau 
that the prov ince would be com pletely  West-Sumatra dominated. At th is  
time a lso  the cen tra l government was try in g  to  e s ta b lis h  uniform  p o l i ­
c ie s  fo r  the whole o f  Indonesia . Acceptance o f  those p o l i c ie s  e l s e ­
where in the country might have been threatened had a Minangkabau prime 
m in ister and m in ister o f  in t e r io r  appeared to  be y ie ld in g  to  Minangka­
bau o p p o s it io n . I t  is  p o s s ib le  too that w ith in  h is  own Masjumi party 
N atsir did not wish to be c a lle d  p a roch ia l by appearing to  indulge in 
fa v o r it ism  towards people from h is  own home area.
N everth eless , the lack  o f  any rep resen ta tiv e  le g is la t iv e  au th ority  
in  the p rov in ce during the e a r ly  1950s was a constant source o f  d is s a t ­
i s fa c t io n  and recr im in a tion . This was at le a s t  p a r tly  held  in  check by 
the p o l i c ie s  and a ttitu d es  o f  the new govern or, M uljohard jo , who, a l ­
though a Javanese, attempted to  reach accommodations w ith the lo c a l  
leaders and stron g ly  represented  h is  p r o v in c e 's  econom ic grievances to 
Dj ak arta .
Although many o f  the broad lin e s  o f  the independence movement in 
West Sumatra p a r a lle le d  those on Java, i t  would be m isleading to  view 
the pattern  o f  the re v o lu t io n  there as a mere copy o f  the Javanese 
model. In f a c t ,  not on ly  was there l i t t l e  s im ila r ity  between the 
events in  Sumatra and those in Java, but in Sumatra i t s e l f  events 
assumed autonomous and d iverse  forms w ith in  d if fe r e n t  re g io n s . There 
were a number o f  fa c to r s  resp on sib le  fo r  t h is .  Upon the base o f  Suma­
t r a 's  con s id erab le  e th n ic  and geograph ica l d iv e r s ity  the Japanese e s ­
ta b lish ed  a d e cen tra lized  a d m in istra tion . This s itu a t io n  was sustained  
throughout the re v o lu t io n , e s p e c ia l ly  during i t s  f i r s t  months, as a 
consequence o f  the rep u b lican  c a p i t a l 's  la ck  o f  co n tro l over a ction s  
pursued by rev o lu tion a ry  leaders on that is la n d . Thus, d esp ite  the 
fa c t  that in  1945 Sumatra was designated  as a s in g le  prov in ce w ith in  
the new R epublic o f  Indonesia , with a governor resp on sib le  fo r  the 
whole o f  the is la n d , events in the d i f fe r e n t  reg ion s were in  fa c t  
la rg e ly  autonomous o f  each o th e r , and th e ir  d ir e c t io n  was determined 
predom inantly by reg ion a l rather than p ro v in c ia l fa c t o r s .
193. A summary o f the chronology o f the dispute is set out in PST, pp. 421-24.
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While West Sumatra's t ie s  w ith the cen tra l government were c lo s e r  
than with the p ro v in c ia l government in  Medan, the Minangkabau saw the 
re la t io n sh ip  as one between equal partners in the stru gg le  rather than 
as one between subordinate and lea d er . This fe e l in g  in part stemmed 
from the im portant r o le  o f  a la rge  number o f  Minangkabau leaders in the 
cen tra l repu blican  government and was sym bolized by the p lace  o f  a West 
Sumatran in  the Sukarno/Hatta duumvirate at the end o f  the Indonesian 
s ta te . This was, however, on ly  part o f  the dual r o le  which the Minang­
kabau people saw them selves p layin g  in the re v o lu t io n . The reg ion  o f  
West Sumatra i t s e l f  they p erce iv ed  as an area o f  in te g ra l importance to  
the rev o lu tion ary  s tru g g le , making a major co n tr ib u tio n  to  i t s  f in a l  
su cce ss . Relevant to  th is  p ercep tion  was the sta tu s o f  B u k ittin gg i as 
the second c a p ita l o f  Indon esia , ready to  become the seat o f  the repub­
l ic a n  government should Jog jakarta  f a l l  to  the Dutch. During 1947 
B u k ittin gg i d id , in  f a c t ,  re-em erge as the c a p ita l o f  Sumatra where 
Hatta d ire c te d  the is la n d 's  a f f a i r s ;  and from December 1948, although 
B u k ittin gg i i t s e l f  was occu p ied  by the Dutch, the Emergency Government 
o f  the rep u b lic  was e s ta b lish e d  in West Sumatra a fte r  the f a l l  o f  
Jog jakarta  and the capture o f  most o f  the top repu blican  lea d ersh ip .
The ro le  which the West Sumatrans saw themselves p layin g  a fte r  the 
Independence Proclam ation was a lso  co n s is te n t  with the importance o f  
the reg ion  as one o f  the major cen ters o f  r e v o lt  against Dutch author­
i t y  during the e a r l ie r  part o f  the century. The number o f  Minangkabau 
leaders e x ile d  by the Dutch as a r e s u lt  o f  a n t ic o lo n ia l  movements there 
had probably combined w ith the g en era lly  a u th orita ria n  nature o f  Japa­
nese ru le  on Sumatra to  leave an apparent vacuum o f  n a t io n a lis t  le a d e r ­
ship in  West Sumatra during the occu pation  y ea rs , with the o ld -tim e  
educator S ja fe i  and the more dynamic younger Chatib Suleiman apparently 
hold ing  a v ir tu a l monopoly o f  the top p o s it io n s  during th is  p e r io d .
But th is  s itu a t io n  was an a r t i f i c i a l  one and changed immediately a fte r  
the con stra in ts  imposed by the Japanese were removed. From the la t t e r  
months o f  1945 p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in  the reg ion  again assumed an a ctiv e  
ch a ra cter , with a d iverse  group o f  men taking up r o le s  o f  lea d ersh ip . 
These included  p o l i t i c a l  leaders o f  the 1920s and ea rly  1930s who r e ­
turned from th e ir  e x i le  in  la te  1945, prewar party  lead ers and minor 
o f f i c i a l s  o f  the c o lo n ia l  adm in istration  whose ro le  had been minimal 
during the Japanese occu p a tion , and a group o f  younger men, n otab ly  
ju n io r  m ilita ry  o f f i c e r s  who had re ce iv ed  m ilita ry  tra in in g  in  the 
Gyugun. Although S ja f e i 's  r o le  dim inished in  importance a fte r  the 
ea rly  months o f  the re p u b lic , Chatib Suleiman continued as one o f  the 
most a c t iv e  younger leaders in the Minangkabau u n t il  h is  death at the 
beginning o f  1949.
A notab le  c h a r a c t e r is t ic  o f  th is  lead ersh ip  group was that d esp ite  
the apparent h eterogen e ity  o f  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  and ex p er ien ce , 
i t  remained remarkably s ta b le  throughout the rev o lu tion a ry  y ea rs . A l­
though there was a broad range o f  views represented  w ith in  i t  there was 
apparently a s u f f i c ie n t  common denominator o f  a ttitu d es  on s o c i a l ,  e c o ­
nomic and p o l i t i c a l  m atters to  perm it coh esion  and con tin u ity  among i t s  
membership. This cannot be exp la in ed  merely by in tern a l s o l id a r i t y  im­
posed by ou tsid e  p ressu res , fo r  th is  fa c t o r  was a lso  op era tive  in  other 
parts o f  Indonesia w ithout r e s u lt in g  in  the same degree o f  cohesion  and 
co n t in u ity . More l ik e ly  th is  c h a r a c t e r is t ic  owed much to the e th n ic  
homogeneity o f  West Sumatra and the long Minangkabau t r a d it io n  o f  b a l ­
ancing apparently c o n f l i c t in g  b e l ie f s  and ideas among th e ir  members in 
a way that avoided u p settin g  the cen tra l cohesion  o f  th e ir  s o c ie ty .
This c h a r a c t e r is t ic  is  in part obscured by the number and d iv e r ­
s i t y  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  p a r tie s  and r e lig io u s  and s o c ia l  groups, togeth er
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with th e ir  independent m ilita ry  u n its , which sprang up and m u ltip lied  
w ith in  West Sumatra from the end o f  1945. But d esp ite  the d iv e r s ity  o f  
th e ir  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  o r ie n ta t io n s  and th e ir  in a b i l i t y  to  coa le sce  
these in to  any u n ifie d  fron t  fo r  more than a few months in  the face  o f  
a common danger, the rep resen ta tives  o f  these groups were able to  work 
togeth er e f f e c t iv e ly  in the KNI and la te r  the DPR, and none o f  them was 
ever excluded from rep resen ta tion  th ere .
Thus, w ith .very  few ex ce p tio n s , the men who stood  at the head o f  
the West Sumatra KNI at the end o f  1945 reta in ed  th e ir  lead ersh ip  p o s i ­
t ion s  r ig h t through u n t il  the tra n s fe r  o f  sov ere ig n ty ; and although 
in tern a l ten sion s developed , these apparently d id  not r e s u lt  in the 
deep p o l i t i c a l  cleavages that were m anifested in other parts o f  Sumatra 
and Java. ^Although the widespread o p p o s itio n  to  repu blican  p o l i c ie s  o f  
compromise w ith the Dutch found th e ir  expression  through the V olk sfron t 
o f  1946 and the March 3 A f fa ir  o f  1947, n e ith er  o f  these movements de­
veloped  in to  the armed con fron ta tion s  between opposing fo r ce s  such as 
occu rred  in  severa l other parts o f  the is la n d , and n e ith er  had any 
major long-term  e f fe c t s  in  a lie n a tin g  se c t io n s  o f  the lea d ersh ip . 
Rather, both movements were ended through some degree o f  compromise and 
re in te g ra t io n  o f  the d is s a t is f ie d  groups w ith in  the ru lin g  b o d ie s . A 
p a r t ia l excep tion  to  th is  appears to  have occu rred  w ith regard to  the 
most con servative  se c t io n  o f  the adat lea d ersh ip , a group which saw i t s  
power being undermined by attempts at rep resen ta tiv e  government wherein 
p o l i t i c a l  and r e lig io u s  groups would a lso  e x e rc is e  au th ority  at the 
n egeri le v e l .  In the la s t  year o f  the re v o lu t io n , then, some o f  the 
adat leaders were w il l in g  to  reach an accommodation w ith the Dutch in  
an attempt to  shore up th e ir  t r a d it io n a l  power and p o s it io n s  w ith in  the 
s o c ie ty . Here again , however, the people in volved  were few, and most 
o f  them seem to have been able to make th e ir  peace with the rep u b lic  as 
soon as i t  became c le a r  that the Dutch e f f o r t s  would f a i l .
The dynamic ch aracter o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in  West Sumatra during the 
re v o lu tio n  owed much to the fa c t  that between 1945 and the end o f  1948 
most o f  the reg ion  stood  ou tsid e  the area o f  strong Dutch p ressu re .
(The on ly  c lo s e  p a r a l le l  to  th is  s itu a t io n  was that ob ta in in g  in A tjeh , 
which maintained i t s  independence from Dutch co n tro l throughout the 
r e v o lu t io n .)  The p o l i t i c a l  lead ers thus had a fre e  hand to  experiment 
with adm in istra tive  and le g is la t iv e  forms and develop systems o f  gov­
ernment which they f e l t  were attuned to  Minangkabau s o c ie t y . In th is  
process they grew from a r e la t iv e ly  in experien ced  group o f  o f f i c i a l s  
in to  a body w ith a high degree o f  p o l i t i c a l  s e lf -c o n s c io u s n e s s , taking 
fo r  granted th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  e x e rc is e  an e f f e c t iv e  governmental co n tro l 
over the a f fa i r s  o f  th e ir  reg ion .
One o f  the major themes in  the p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d  was the contin u ing 
e f f o r t  to  reach a more rep resen ta tiv e  form o f  government w ith in  the r e ­
g ion . The aim was in  part to  end the com plete domination o f  lo c a l  
a f fa ir s  by the t r a d it io n a l penghulu group and to  put them in to  the 
hands o f  a wider spectrum o f  le a d e rs . As ea rly  as 1946 e le c t io n s  fo r  
rep resen ta tiv e  co u n c ils  at the n egeri le v e l  were held  to  accom plish 
t h is .  E ssen tia l to  these concepts was the idea o f  autonomy and s e l f -  
s u f f ic ie n c y  at each le v e l  o f  government, and fo r  th is  reason there were 
con s id erab le  e f f o r t s  during the next two years to  make the v i l la g e  ad­
m in istra tion s  la rge  enough and to  tra in  th e ir  o f f i c i a l s  s u f f i c ie n t ly  
fo r  these u n its  to  re ta in  a con s id erab le  degree o f  independence from 
the higher le v e ls  o f  the a d m in istra tion . I t  was fo r  th is  reason too  
that the Central Sumatran KNI moved so ra p id ly  in 1948 to  implement the 
d e c e n tra liz a t io n  law passed by the Jog jakarta  government w ith regard to
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autonomous le v e ls  o f  adm in istration  at the p r o v in c ia l ,  kabupaten and 
w ila jah  le v e ls .  And i t  is  notab le  that in  com batting the Dutch attempts 
to se t up a Minangkabau s ta te  in  e a r ly  1949, the republican  leaders in 
West Sumatra, w hile lay in g  s tre ss  on th e ir  lo y a lty  to the r e p u b lic , ad­
vocated  an autonomous status fo r  the Minangkabau reg ion  w ith in  the 
R epublic o f  Indonesia rather than i t s  com plete and u n q u a lified  in c o r ­
p ora tion .
At the p ro v in c ia l le v e l  the d iv is io n  o f  Sumatra in to  three sepa­
rate  prov in ces in  1948 merely acknowledged the fa i lu r e  o f  e f f o r t s  to 
crea te  a s in g le  p rov in ce  on the is lan d  and r a t i f i e d  the broad lin e s  o f  
the s itu a t io n  which had e x is te d  there s in ce  1945. However, the group­
ing o f  the three re s id e n c ie s  o f  West Sumatra, Riau and Djambi in to  the 
p rov in ce  o f  Central Sumatra held  the d is t in c t  p o s s ib i l i t y  that the more 
coh esive  ‘p o l i t i c a l  lead ersh ip  and eth n ic  homogeneity o f  West Sumatra 
would lead to  i t s  dominating the new p rov in ce .
The a ction s  o f  the cen tra l government in  1950-51 appeared to  ne­
gate much o f  the progress which had been achieved in West Sumatra 
during the rev o lu tion ary  years towards autonomy in  lo c a l  a f fa i r s  and 
some form o f  rep resen ta tiv e  government. I t  must have appeared to  many 
o f  the Minangkabau that th e ir  p o s it io n  in the Indonesian s ta te  had now 
not merely reverted  to that o f  1945 but in some ways c lo s e ly  resem bled 
that o f  the la s t  year o f  Dutch r u le . In 1950 Sumatra was d iv id ed  m i l i ­
t a r i ly  in to  two reg ion s w ith headquarters r e s p e c t iv e ly  at Medan and 
Palembang and the c iv i l i a n  government o f  the prov ince o f  Central Suma­
tra  was removed from the hands o f  lo c a l  rep resen ta tiv es  to  those o f  
appointees o f  the In te r io r  M in istry  in  D jakarta.
The lo y a lty  o f  West Sumatra to  the rep u b lican  government through­
out the re v o lu t io n  had c le a r ly  been strengthened by the presence o f  so 
many Minangkabau in  i t s  cen tra l le a d ersh ip . However, the men whom the 
West Sumatrans had regarded as th e ir  rep resen ta tiv es  on Java c le a r ly  
d id  not view th e ir  reg ion  o f  o r ig in  as having claim s on th e ir  lo y a lty  
that cou ld  be perm itted  to  in flu en ce  th e ir  approach to  n a tion a l p o l i ­
c ie s  a rrived  at in  D jakarta. I t  is  p o s s ib le  that they w ere, in  f a c t ,  
w il l in g  to  move the more r e s o lu te ly  against West Sumatra because o f  
th e ir  ce r ta in ty  o f  i t s  adherence to  the rep u b lic  and because they wished 
to  se t an example fo r  other reg ion s on whom they cou ld  not so com plete­
ly  r e ly . The im portant r o le  which the Minangkabau in  West Sumatra saw 
them selves p layin g  in  the stru g g le  with the Dutch was never recogn ized  
by the cen tra l government as having such major relevance to  the outcome 
o f  the rev o lu tion ary  s tru g g le  as to  warrant th e ir  being perm itted  a 
degree o f  autonomy which i f  granted to  other reg ion s might threaten  the 
cohesion  o f  the new u n itary  s ta te .
